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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During the pressing course of intemational events in the nuclear
age, most Americans are inclined to regard the great bulk of the North
American continent north of the Rio Grande as a tranquil bastion of
unanimity in a sea ·or diverse, quarreling states and groups of states
continually vying for pover in the world arena.

Such an outlook, however,

is decidedly incorrect for it is based either upon the false a&SUllption
that the foreign polic7 o_f our Canadian neighbors is synonymous with that
ot the United States or, worse, that Canada is for all intents and pur
poses unimportant or virtually non-existent and, hence, without a
meaningful foreign policy. This ignorance of Canada not only manifests
itself in regard to questions of foreign polic7 but in addition holds
true for all things Canadian. A:mericans in general sillply take Canada
for granted or forget it exists altogether.

This attitude toward one's

neighbor, all1', and best custom.er is qtlite inappropriate and, in fact,
dangerous when extended to the field of foreign affairs.
This writer certainly has no illusions as to the possibility of
correcting this attitude by means of this thesis.

It is felt, nonetheless,

that a discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities in Canadian and
United States policies on major Cold War issues serves a useful purpose in
helping to clarify the fact that while both countries have an interest in
protecting themselves against aggression and in promoting Western liberal
1

2

traditions, the policies of both nations are not always similar.

This study will also bring out the important ract that neither

the United States nor Canada formulates its .foreign policies alone.

The

two nations are so closel,1' associated that neither could act alone in the
:international arena without taking cognisance of the attitudes or the

other. Essentially, the situation which exists is that of a large and a
small country sharing the same continent with the smaller nation striving

on the one hand to maintain its independence from its larger partner and

on the other seeking to achieve the same international goals of the latter
under its leadership.

As

the big neighbor with

many

other considerations,

the United States has not always given due consideration to its smaller

partner.

For Canada the ,mequal relationship

has

been of vast importance,

while for the United States it has been of rather minimal significance.
Rather

than

attempt to anaqze the entire scope of the foreign re

lations of both countries, this thesis will concern itself with studies

of four important foreign policy issues of the Cold War as well as an

initial chapter examining the major goals and precepts of American and

Canadian foreign policy.

Chapters have been included on Cuba, the North

American Air Defense Command, the Horth Atlantic Treaty Organization, and

China in order to provide a good selection o.r important and representative

issues upon which worthwhile conclusions can be made.

CHAPTER Il
THE GENERAL FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA ·
The appropriate place to begin a study of the similarities and

dissimilarities of United States and Canadian foreign policies on major
Cold War issues and the influence of each country- upon the foreign
policies of the other is with an examination of the general purposes of
those foreign policies.

It is only after determining the general policies

of the two nations that the individual issues can be correct� an&qzed

and understood.

Since the close of' the Second World War, the United States has been

the recognized leader of' those nations of the globe which have grouped
themselves into what is normal� referred to as the Free World.

In

opposition to this grouping is the block of communist states led primarily
by the Soviet Union but rivaled in recent years by an emerging Communist

China.

The United States assumed the leadership role of the Free World

somewhat paintully during the Truman administration after it became

evident in the immediate post-World War II period that the Big Five

alliance of' the United States, France, Great Britain, China, and the

Soviet Union which had united to defeat the Axis powers would not survive

to become the nucleus of' a new world order which would eliminate any

future possibilities of world conflict.

It was through such events as

the loss of Eastern Europe to Soviet imperialism, the Berlin Airlift,

the end of the United States nuclear monopoly, and the Korean conflict
3

that the United States acquired the psychological conditioning and ex-
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perience necessary for Free World leadership in what has come to be known
as the Cold War�
During this time of "baptisa bu fire" for the United States, Canada
too was faced with momentous decisions regarding its own course of action
in world affairs. Farsighted Canadians could see that the historical
triangular.relationship between Canada, Great Britain, and the United
States which had served their country so well by balancing off the some
what more import.ant and traditional English transatlantic influence with
the American southerly influence and thereby preserving an independent
Canada would become more and more a north-south relationship as American
power and influence eclipsed that of Great Britain. The Canadian fear
of absorption by the United States consequently grew as the American
magnet increased in strength. Thus, while Canada, like the United
States, cast her lot with the Free World in opposing international
communism, she nonetheless had to remain ever mindful of protecting her

own independence .from, coincidentally enough., the very country which was

her chief benefactor and accepted leader, the United States.

To Americans this fear of absorption on the part of Canada might
at first seem rather groundless, but the facts tend to support Canada's
fears.

United States :influence over a large segment of the Canadian

economy is only slight� less than overwhelming. Figures from the year
1965 indicate that American interests control 52 per cent of the mining
and smelting industry; 95 per cent of the automotive industry; 90 per
cent of the rubber products industry";

75 per cent of the petroleum

5
industry; and 65 per cent of the electrical appliances industry in
Canada. At the present rate of American investment, it is estimated

that 80 per· cent of Canada I a manufacturing industry will be under ·
.
American control in twenty years. 1 Indeed, no nation can afford to have

such a large percentage of its own industry controlled by' another country
and still hope to exercise any degree of independence in foreign or even

domestic affairs.
The entire problem facing Canada in regard to the United States

was stated quite. accurately by Mason Wade in the book The United States
and Canada:

Canada has alvays been a willed nation, existing despite the
conscious and unconscious foTces which have sought to absorb it
into its much more populous and powerful neighbor. As the post
war period opened, the will to maintain the Canadian nation which
had achieved new world status as a result of its remarkable war
ti.llle efforts was probably stronger than ever before, and continu
ing boom instead of anticipating depression revived the hope of
the twentieth being Canada I s century. A Canadian nationalism
which had long reacted against British dominance was now to react
chief4" against the United States, as Washington replaced London
as the chief center of influence upon Canada, and as American
pressures on Canada increased in countless ways. But coupled
with the instinctive traditional tendency to resist
Americanization was the reluctant realization that, whether
Canadians liked it or not, Canada's dest� was now bound up
with that of the United States, that the north-south continental
relationship had become imnaenser more significant than the
traditional transatlantic ones.

1aerald Clark ., Canada:
Mciq Comp8Jl1', 1965), P• 90.

The Uneasy Neighbor (New York:

David

2Mason Wade, "The Roots of the Relationship " The United States
.,
� Canadat ed. John S. Dickey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. i Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1964J, pp • .$3-54.
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During the early postwar period, both the United States and
Canada thus were forced to adapt to entirely new roles in the field of
foreign affairs.

The United States had to alter its outlook on world

affairs from an isolationist position to an involved, internationalist
position, whereas Canada had to sever the last vestiges of' its •colonial"
ties with Great Britain, establish itself in the world as a "middle

power,• and at the same time preserve itself intact from incorporation

into the United States. Neither course proved eas;r for the two countries,
and the difficulties surrounding their roles manifest themselves on marJ1'

occasions even today.

As the lead.er or the Free World, America has forged a foreign

policy which in its essential characteristics has been dominated by the

goal of ha1ting the spread of international communism. The pri.mary'

method-at least in Europe--or achieving this goal has been through the

use or the containment policy first enunciated in 1947 by George F.
Kennan in an anonymous article in Foreign Affairs magazine. 3 Alliances
were created in the earlier period of the Cold War for the purposes of
protecting United States,interests and preventing further comnnmist
encroachments on non-communist areas of the world.

The various proble:ms

which have arisen around the world have been judged according to the
potential communist threat inherent within them and dealt with

accordingly.

Canadians, on the other hand, have taken a somewhat less

3willia P. Gerberding, United States Foreign Policy:
Perspectives � Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Comp8JJ1', 1966),
P• 17.
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rigid approach toward the communist threat which has been, in fact, more
coincident with their position in the world as a middle power. This

approach has persisted throughout the Cold War period, and it is this
somewhat more flexible Canadian approach to East-West tensions which
has led to occasional problems between the two countries.

Part of the background of the Canadian uneasiness ••• is
the tact that Canadians, while certainly gener� sympathetic
to the United States in the present world crisis, do not all
have unllmited confidence in American policy. They are in fact
rather less inclined to run a high tenperature over the Russian
menace than Americans are. Canada's idea of a world policy was
thus defined by" a member of the Government in 1960: "an un
remitting search for the lessening of international tensigns
and ••• means of bringing about permanent disarmament. "

During the Cold War period, the Canadians have developed a certain

capacity for mediating disputes and taking part in peace-keeping missions

of various types.

Canada has been in the forefront a disproportionatell'

large number of tim�s in seeking a peaceful solution to issues which have

divided the Eastern and Western blocs of nations even though her ultimate

allegiance has always been vi.th the West.

Canadian participation in the

Cyprus dispute, the Suez crisis, and the International Control Commission
in Vietnam are examples of that nation's role as a mediator in world

affairs.

In regard to the United Nations, Canadian policy has been one of

placing a considerable amount of faith in that organization in the search

for some form of world order.

4c.

"Canadians seem at times more inclined

P. Stacey, "Twenty-one Years of Military Co-operation,"
Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. David R. Deener (Durham, North
Carolina: �e University Press, 1963), p. 120.
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than Americans to look to the United Nations, with hope if' not with con
fidence ., as the ultimate rock upon which international peace might be

built; and there is less cynicism about its evident weaknesses.•$ The
primar;r reason tor this faith in the United Nations lies once again in
Canada's characteristic approach to world affairs as a mediator and

middle power. The United Nations serves as an indispensable organ tor
Canada's mediation and conciliation work.
While the United States has undertaken to organize and lead several
alliances, Canada

has

sought to remain somewhat less involved in this

respect by restricting herself to membership :fn the North American Air
Defense Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ., and the Common
wealth of lfations. While this membership list might at first appear
rather consequential, it should be remembered that NORAD is essential.ly" a
bilateral, continental defense agreement, and membership in the loosely

lmit Commonwealth is simply- a manifestation of' Canada's traditional
attachment to Great Britain. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
represents the o� major commitment on the part of' Canada in Cold War

organizations far-removed from Canadian territory. Signif'icantq, Canada
has sought to remain somewhat aloof from Western Hemisphere affairs by

remajning outside the Organization of American States.

"Canadian

in

difference ., small commercial interest, and tear of becoming involved in
disputes between the United States and other me mbere of the OAS replaced
$Richard A. Preston Canada in World Affairs:
.,
(Toronto: Oxford University Press,1965), p. 3.

1959-1961

the earlier chief impediment..-lack of American enthusiasm for Canadian

9

me�bership.•6 Likewise, Canada sought no participation in the Southeast

Asia Treat7 Organization or the Central Treat7 Organization when these
organizations were formed.

Lack of involvement in these alliances has

enabled Canada to maintain a more independent stance in affairs affect
ing these areas and

has

increased her capacity for the role of mediator.

The United States, as either the leading member in such alliances or as a
staunch supporter in the case of CENTO, has

deeply involved as a participant in

a.n:r

in these areas.

al'W&.y'S

become immediate� and

dispute or crisis which has arisen

This difference in the respective roles plqed by Canada and the

United States in international affairs has been at the root of

lDBJ1Y

the differences in foreign policies which have arisen over the past

of

twenty years. A particular policy utilized by the United States as an
involved and committed leader has not a1W'81'8 coincided with the par

ticular policy followed by Canada as a middle power quite often unmvolved

in the issue at hand.

In a 1965 speech, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson made

the following statement on the conduct of his country's foreign affairs

vis-a-vis those of the United States:

Canadian views on specific issues are not alwqs the same as
those of the United States. There is not always a complete
identity of interests between them, nor will there be in the
future. This is because, over the years, we have been developing
6

Ibid., P• 176.
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our own character in Canada, our own external interests and our
own judgments, just as the United States has developed its.
While we mu.st never ignore the heavy world responsibilities of
the United States, we feel bound to speak with our own voice on
any problem., which are of concern to us. We like to know what
our big partners are doing, especially' our neighbor. This, how
ever, should not be cause for diequiet. Canadian interests in
fact run parallel to those of the United States over a very wide
range of problems, and our two cTtries have a fundamentally'
similar outlook on world affairs.
This passage indicates the note of independence which Canadians feel they
mu.st inject into their foreign policy on various occasions. Yet it also
illustrates Canadian recognition of the United States' position as leader
of the Free World.

Prime Minister Pearson points out that the fundamental

interests of the United States and Canada are the same but that this fact
alone does not rule out differences of opinion regarding particular inter
national issues which may concern the two nations.
Most of the countries of the world probab:cy- have not felt the need
to •prove" their independence of thought and action in foreign affairs as
has Canada. Once again the Canadian fear of being ignored or taken for
granted b,- the United States is manifested in Mr. Pearson's statement.
This strong desire to exert Canadian independence in foreign af'!airs has
been demonstrated on more than one occasion during the Cold War and

should not be overlooked in examining the foreign policies of Canada in
relation to those of the United States.

In general the United States has

respected what at times appears to be an exaggerated preoccupation

with

an independent foreign policy on the part of Canada, although on occasions
7Lester B. Pearson, "Good Neighborhood, tt Foreign Affairs, XLIII
(January, 1965 ), 260-261.
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such as the Cuban missile crisis, this American patience has shown signs

of disappearing. Canadian leaders have indicated that they realize that
dif'ference for the mere sake of difference in the conduct of their
country's foreign policy is unwise.

In a speech before the Canada Club

of Ottawa in February, 1965, Prime Minister Pearson stated:

· The satisfaction we get from national identity and independence
must be related to the requirements of interdependence and the
recognition of the global responsibilities or the United States
in the pursuit of objectives and values that we share • • • •
We must never disagree with the United States •ae'.q for the
purpose of rousing a chauvinistic cheer at home.

The United States has never publicq indicated its assessment of

Canada's attempt at keeping its foreign policy disagreements with the
United States above the nchauvinistic cheers, " but Secretary of State
Dulles and later President Kennedy gave indications that they were some

what perturbed at Canada over particular instances or disagreement.

It

appears, nonetheless, that Canada and the United States have general:cy,

managed to keep their disagreements behind closed doors in an effort to
compromise and to keep them from becoming too intense and salt-centered.
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, indicated

the five basic requirements necessary for an independent Canadian foreign

policy, none of which should create undue anxiety in the United States
over possible Canadian chauvinism.

The five requirements were:

(1) We must have military security;
(2) We must have expanding economic strength;
(3) We mu.st be able to exert influence on others;

8Leater B. Pearson, "The Face of the World in 1965," External
Affairs, XVII (March, 1965), 85.
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(4) We must be able and willing to play a creative role in many
areas of international affairs; and
(5) We must maintain a basic unity at ho• in Canada concerning our
national interest in world af'fairs. 9
A.ctual:q, none of these five points is very extraordinary, and most
nations undoubte� conduct their foreign relations along similar broad
outlines as these. Proximity to the United States, however, places
Canada in a particularly vulnerable position in regard to the first
three requirements. American influence and power cannot

be

ignored by

Canada even if that country so desired. The fifth point, while holding

true for all nations, is obvious:q, in reference to the recurrent diffi

culties which the Canadians are experiencing between the English-speaking
majority and the increasing:q, separatist-minded French-speaking minority.

Dissension in the put .four to five years has come increasingly into the
open with the very- future of Canadian nationhood sometimes appearing to

be in some doubt.

In examining the foreign policies of the United States and Canada,

it is essential to have some knowledge of the various forces in each
country which pl&y' a part in the creation of its foreign poliey.

Both

nations have a representative form of government with Canada utilizing

a Parliamentary system and the United States a Presidential system.

Because both countries have a representative system, individual

legislators are subject in quite similar ways to various pressure groups
and other outside influences which seek to determine various courses in

9Paul Martin, "An Independent Foreign Policy, " External Affairs
XVIll (March, 1966), 12$.
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foreign affairs just as in aey other :field.

Immigrant groups, labor

unions, farm organizations ., industry, the military ., and the news media
have all pl.&1'ed a part in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy just
as

their counterparts have in the United States. Indeed ., many Canadian

labor unions and businesses are controlled by their counterparts in the
10
Farm groups from the Canadian prairies have been active
United States.
1n pressing the Canadian government to sell increasingq more wheat to

Communist China.

A. V. Roe Canada, Ltd., manufacturer of the ill-

starred Arrow interceptor ., attempted to determine Canadian foreign policy

in regard to the North American Air Defense Command by lobbying for a

production decision for its aircraf't--an attempt which proved unsuccess
tui. 12 Such attempts to influence foreign policy are numerous in Canada

just as they are in the United States.

In this country- attempts to in

fluence :foreign policy abound with the National Council o:r Churches'
pressure for recognition of Communist China and the refusal o:r the

National Maritime Union to load British ships trading with North
Vietnam serving as recent examples.

The conduct of Canadian foreign relations is in the hands of the

Department of External Affairs headed by the Secretary of State for
lOClark, .2!?•

£ll•,

P• 217.

12Peter c. Newman Renegade _!!! Power: The Diefenbaker Years
.,
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. , 1963), p. 3L.S.
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External Affairs which is the counterpart to the United States Department
of State headed by the Secretary of State. Both Secretaries are cabinet
level officials responsible in Canada to the Prime Minister and in the
United States to the President. In Canada, however, the Secretary of
State for External Affairs must first be a member of the House of
Commons before he can be appointed to the cabinet post by the Prime
Minister. The American Secretary of State, of course, is not a member
of either house of Congress. Committees concerned with the conduct of
foreign affairs exist in both the Canadian House of Commns and Senate
just as in the United States House of Representatives and Senate, but
the influence and prestige of the Canadian committees do not measure up
to those of' their American counterparts.

This characteristic, however,

by no means indicates that the Canadian legislature, which is for all
practical purposes the House of Commons, has less control over foreign
policy than the United States Congress. Actually, Canadian govemments
can fall as a result of poor foreign policy decisions which is not true
in the case of the United States government. A recent example is that
of the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker which fell in 1963
partially as a result of foreign policy difficulties with the United
13
States and the world in general.
Little more needs to

be

said concerning the general outlines of

Canadian and United States foreign policies or the instruments by which
they carry out their respective policies.

13

�., P•

400.

In the an�sis of the several

major Cold War issues which follows, it is essential to rem.ember the
differences in power, thinking, objectives, and organization which
exist between the two countries.

15

CHA.PrER III
THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
The first aajor Cold War issue to be dealt with in this study con
cerns the establishment and operation of the North American Air Defense
Command normally referred to as NORAD.

Probably no other issue has

pointed up the major difficulties facing Canada and the United States in
reconciling their differences on the proper conduct ot the Cold War as

has NORAD.

Canadian soYereignty; the su.prenaacy of American influence

over the traditional British influence; the method of approach to the
communist threat; and the nu.clear weapons issue all have plqed and, in
tact, continue to play a part in the debate over Canadian membership in
the bilateral NORAD pact. For the United States, on the other hand,
NORAD has been simply an instrument for protecting North America from
Soviet nuclear attack through the combined air defense forces of both the
United States and Canada.1 The establishment of NORAD did not present
the United States with the soul-searching questions in regard to its own
role in the Cold War as it did in the case of Canada.
In actuality the establishment of the North American Air Defense
Command in 1957 did not mark the first time that Canada and the United
States

had

ceoperated in the field of defense.

"Canadian-.lmerican joint

defense planning began with the establishment o:f' a Permanent Joint Board
¾li.chael Barkway, "Canada Rediscovers Its History," Foreign
Affairs, XXXVI (.April, 19$8), 410.
16
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of Defence •to consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half

of the Western Hemisphere, ' by the Ogdensburg Declaration of August 17-

18, 1940.• 2 The Ogdensburg agreement was soon supplemented on April 20,
1941 by the Hyde Park Declaration in which both nations agreed to the
"general principle that in mobilizing the resources of this continent

each country should pro'Yi.de the other with the defense articles which
it is best able to produce • •• and the production program should be
coordinated to this end."3 These two declarations prond sufficient to
get the two countries throngh the Second World War without undue diffi
culties.

On

February 12, 1947 the Joint Statement for Defense Collabora

tion was signed which provided for lillited collaboration for peacetime

joint security and represented the first non-wartime defense arrangement
between the two nations. 4

It was not until the next decade, however, that joint defense co

operation took the form of impressive strategic defense installations
designed specifical.17 for the nt1clear age.

In 19.54, the Pinetree Line,

a joint radar-equipped detection system in Canada, w as completed, with

both nations contributing to the effort.

In the same year the Canadian

onl.y- Mid-Canada Line, likewise a radar detection system, was completed.

2-rheodore Ropp, "Politics, Strategy, and the Commitments of a
Middle Power," Canada..United States Treaty Relations, ed., DaTid R.
Deener (Durhaa, N. c.: Duke UniTersity Press, 1963), p. 81.

)Ibid., PP• 81-82.
�bid., P• 82.
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In 195 7 the third and last detection system, the Distant Early Warning
(DEW) Line, a joint Canadian-American project, was finished. S These

earl)" warning systems designed to alert both countries to the approach
of SoTiet nuclear bombers were incorporated into the NORAD system when

that command became operational. The participation of the United States

in the DEW Line project, however, proTOked some criticism in Canada over

the possible loss of Canadian sovereignty in the northern part of that

country.

This criticism arose over the fear that American command of

isolated sites in Canada might gradually extend itself over the un
deTeloped northern wilds of the nation and in so doing displace Canadian
6
authority at least temporarily and possibly even permanently.
With the formation of the North American Air Defense Command

seTeral controTersial issues came decidedly into view as tar as Canadians
were concerned. It was one thing to

have

radar warning systems strung

out on Canadian soil whose purpose could be regarded as entirely defensive
and non-com.batiTe, but it was entirely another matter to join into a pact

with a vastly more powerful United States in which advanced weapons sys
tems with nuclear capabilities would play a Tital role.

In any all-out

nuclear war involving the United States, Canada, by virtue of its member
ship in NORAD, would automatically' become a participant, willingly' or

otherwise.

Because its geographic location placed it in the middJ.e of

Sc. P. Stacey, "hent7-one Years of Military" Co-operation,"
Canada-United States Tre;gr Relations, ed. David R. Deener (Durham, N. C.:
Duke University Press ., l 3 ), pp. il.4-115.
6Ibid. ,

P•

115.
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the attack route for Soviet bombers approaching the United States,
Canada would unavoidably become a major combat zone.

These facts tended

to heighten the controversy surrounding the NORAD issue in the minds of
many Canadians as might be expected.
One of the difficulties lying at the bottom or the NORAD

controversy resulted from the differences in opinion regarding the threat
of Soviet nuclear attack.

In accord with its foreign policy in general,

the United States took the threat of surprise nuclear attack from the

communist world seriously-, and the NORAD defense agreement was a logical
7
step in meeting this threat.
Canadians, however, had always taken a

more skeptical attitude than .Americans toward the possibilities of a
nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. Defense authorities in Canada,
cirllian and military alike, were less inclined to alarmist fears when
eTaluating various intelligence reports on communist military capabilities and motives.

Canada's feelings regarding the necessity of the

NORAD pact, therefore, differed from those or the United States.

Canada

did not wish to become over-involved emotionally in a defense agreement

upon which she did not place as overriding importance as did her neighbor

to the south.

This skepticism regarding the threat which NORAD was de

signed to counter did not dissolve after the establishment of the command
and, indeed, in 1962 severely" hindered the operations of NORAD when the

7Robert s. Horowitz, � Ramparts
Books, Inc., 1964), P• 66.

!!! Watch

(Derby', Conn.: Monarch

8James Bay.rs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues," .'!:h! United
States and Canada, ed. John S. Dickey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.i Prentice
Hall, Iiic:, 1964), P• 6 3.
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United States undertook certain precautionary moves in order to protect
the North American continent from possible Soviet nuclear attack.
This difference

in

the interpretation of Soviet motives and

capabilities, however, did not obscure another fear Canadians had of
involvement in an integrated defense system for the North American
continent.

Canadians feared that regardless of the chances

or nuclear

war between the United States and the Soviet Union, they did not want

their nation to become automatically involved as a belligerant in the

conflict merely because of its participation in NORAD.9 They reasoned

that Canada, as a decidedly junior partner in the agreement, would have
very little influence over American policy if and when that policy came
into direct conflict with that of the Soviet Union. Should such an
event occur, American officials would be forced,

in

all likelihood, to

make crisis-ridden decisions with their Canadian allies being consulted
only to a very limited degree or not at all. The probable result ot
such rapidly transpiring events would be that Canada, with :military
bases on its soil partially intended for defense of the United States,
would find herself a target of Soviet bombers automatically without
having the slightest say in any decisions leading to such a terrible
chain of events.
Differing from their Canadian allies, Americans considered the
NORAD pact as merely a defense arrangement which carried with it no
9aichard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs:
(Toronto: Oxford University Press,1965}, p. 146.
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inherent dangers or involTing Canada unwillin� in a war because or
unilateral actions on the part or the United States. _They stressed that
the NORAD agreement required consultation between both countries and
that neither nation had authority to initiate o!tensive nuclear or non
nuclear action . 10 The Strategic Air Command {SAC) represented the
United States nuclear retaliatory- forces, and this strictly American

force was not included within the North American Air Defense Command.

In their military planning American strategists regarded SAC and NORAD
as

the two halves of a powerful and J1Utually conaplinlentary o!.fensive-

defensive team.

Nonetheless, many Canadians still felt that the NORAD

agreement as it stood might arbitrarily bind them to involvement in an

American war.

This rear or being drawn into an unwanted war touched closely to

another paramount concern of most Canadians. This concern arose over

rear of a possible loss

or Canadian sovereignty. Since the Second World

War, Canadian nationalism had become more persistent, and Canadian

foreign policy in part reflected this upsurge or national feeling .

Canadians had no desire to find the recently- eradicated British in

fiuence replaced by American infiuence, and in 19$7 the NORAD agreement

appeared to many Canadians both inside and outside the governaent to be
10

"NORAD:
1957), 67.

Defense or a Continent, 11
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Air University Staff, Organization for National Security
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1962), PP • 89.90.
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tangible evidence that such an event was in the process of coming about.
As the infiuential Toronto Globe and Mail stated :

"It would be truly

catastrophic if, in the name of defence, we threw away--or even appeared
to throw awq-the eonreignty we are supposed to be defending . n12 The
fear or losing Canadian sovereignty thus was injected into the NORAD
dispute and this highl7 charged emtional factor served only to increase
the amount or controYersy surrounding the agreement .
Proponents of the "loss of sovereigntytt argument rarely mentioned
the fact that a Canadian was always to be second in command of NORAD and
that Canadian officers would comm.and four or the nine regional areas or

the command, including some which contained American units . 13 Within
the military establishment, at least, it appeared to many Americans
that Canadians had been granted more authority than was actually'
warranted . The soYereignty issue, as far as it concerned the early

warning sites in Canada, died in 19S9 when the United States announced

it would tum over command of all the sites it controlled to Canada.14

While the facts seem to indicate that no devious plot was ever being
fonnulated in the United States to take over Canadian territocy, and
that there was little chance that such territory- Jllight inadvertently
slip under American control, the soTereignty questioDi has continued to
12

Preaton1 .21?• �· , P• lh7 •

13:rred

Alexander, Canadians and Foreign Policy (Toronto :
Toronto University Press, 1960), p."'liJi.
l.Jiibid.
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plague the NORAD pact since its beginning in 1957 . While the discontent

is not as widespread in Canada now as it was in the late 1950 1 s, it
still remains a factor affecting the overall NORAD situation.

Since the inception of the North American A.d.r Defense Coaand,
Canadians have found cause to complain about the disposition of its
defense forces. Canadians have been inclined. to view NORAD as being
intended primarily to defend the bases ot the Strategic Air Command,
and since these bases are all in the United States rather than in

Canada, the latter supposedly has been regarded as a peripheral area. 15

.A.ctual.17, an examination of NORAD ' s air defense system would show this theory
to be untrue since most of it is deployed for the defense of the continent ' s
16
most important cities and industrial centers.
In an attempt to allq
Canadian fears, the U.S. Department of Defense, upon recommendation of
the Senate Armed Services Sub-committee, studied the feasibility of
moving several Bomarc missile sites from the United States to Canada, but
the expense of relocation proved prohibitive. 17 Later, however, two
Bc,marc sites were established on Canadian soil.
The question of nuclear weapons has troubled the NORAD alliance
since 1957. The United States has always regarded nuclear warheads on

its air defense weapons as necessary to insure the destruction of most

15Preaton,

£1?• cit. , P• 145.

16.11r University Sta.ff, �· �., P • 0.
$
17P.reston, �· �. , P•

14,.

or an attacking Soviet bomber force. 18 Thus, American forces in the

24

North American Air Defense Command have always been equipped with
nuclear weapons as a matter or military policy. Their existence is
taken for granted by both the .American government and public.

Contrary

to the United States government 's desire to equip NORAD forces with
nuclear weapons, the Canadian government balked for a long time on making
a decision permitting its forces to be supplied with such weapons .
During the earlJr years or NORAD in the late 1950 1 s, several talks
had taken place between the United States and Canada on the defense sys
tem and nu.clear weapons. With the cancellation on February 20, 1959 of
the Arrow interceptor program, Canada was left without a nuclear weapons
delivery syst8Jll of its own. 19 Canada then asked the United States to
build two Bomaro ground-to-air missile bases in Canada which had
previously been planned for sites in upper New York and Michigan.

The

United States agreed to the move and, in addition, paid for the
construction costs. 20 Talks between the two nations followed in which
Canadians assured Americans that their country would accept nuclear war
heads for the missiles, and Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker
stressed in a House or Commons speech on February 20, 1959 that "the
full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they

18Air University Sta.tr, .2£• �. , P • 91.
l9peter c . Newman, Renegade in Power : !a! Diefenbaker Years
(Nev York t Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963 ), P • 3L,8.
20Ibid. ,
PP• 348-349.
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are armed with nuclear warheads. n 21 A later agreement followed on May
25, 1959 whereby both countries agreed to an "exchange of nuclear in
formation for mutual defence, " and Canadian troops were to be trained
in the use of nuclear weapons. 22 But nowhere had Canada formally con
sented in writing to arm its defense forces with nuclear weapons.
Difficulties soon arose over section 92

or the United States

Atomic Energy Act, which specifically required that atomic warheads
could not be transferred out of American custody .

This restriction

angered many Canadians, and the Canadian government delq-ed aaking a
decision on accepting nuclear warheads. 2 3 In February, 1962 the
Canadian Bomarc missile bases were completed, but they remained useless
because Canada still had not acquired nuclear weapons. Likewise, in
June, 1962 Canada obtained sixty-four CF-lOlB jet interceptors from the
United States which also lacked a nuclear capability because of the

Canadian government ' s continued failure to acquire nuclear weapons. 24
This policy disagreement between the two countries continued until the
Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, with NORAD forces in the United

States being fully equipped with nuclear weapons and those in Canada

being equipped either with conventional warheads or sand ballast . This
21
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policy on nuclear weapons also extended to Canadian forces stationed in
Europe assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
While the Canadian govermnent was not satisfied with the desire
of the United States to retain custody over warheads, a more important
issue was actually at the base ot the disagreement :
The opposition to nuclear weapons reflected the persistent
Canadian anxiety to make some useful contribution beyond the Cold
War to the cause of world order. This urge was confused by argu
ments of dubious logic and morality, but behind it was a convic
tion that, regardless of who retained ultimate con}tol, as few
countries as possible should have nuclear weapons. 5
The Canadian government, while willing to cooperate with the
United States in the NORAD alliance, appeared to want to restrict its
role to manning radar sites and maintaining a conventional weapons sys
tem and leave the nuclear role to the United States. While this fact
might seem to reflect a large degree of trust by Canada in the protection
of the United States, it actually demonstrated more accurately Canada ' s
hope of being able to play an important part in helping to bring about
some form of nuclear weapons disannament by retraining from accepting
such weapons on its own soil.
February 26, 1962, stated :

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, on

We take the stand that in the interests of

11

disarmament, everything must be done to assure success if it can be
attained, and the nuclear family' should not be increased so long as there

is arry possibility of disarmament among the nations of the world . tt 26

25John

w. Holmes, "Canada in Search of Its Role, " Foreign
Affairs, XLI ( July, 196 3 ), 662.
26
Hewman, �· cit., P • 351.

27
The Diefenbaker government ' s attitude toward atomic warheads re
mained unchanged., and in October ., 1962 NORAD was faced with a crisis of
major proportions during the confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union over the attempt by the latter to introduce
offensive missiles into Cuba. Difficulties arose between the United
States and Canada when Prime Minister Diefenbaker refused to permit
nuclear armed American NORAD interceptors and SAC bombers to land at
forward bases in Canada.

In addition, Canadian forces assigned to

NORAD were not permitted to reach the necessary alert status antil two
days after the crisis had begun. Diefenbaker gave as his reason for
this delay and inaction the fact that the United States had chosen only
to "inform" Canada of its decisions in the Cuban crisis when the NORAD
agreement actually- provided for a full discussion of the situation be
fore any decisions were reaohed. 27
When Canada finally did act in accord with NORAD policy, it was
largely a meaningless gesture. The Royal Canadian Air Force 's sixty-f'our
CFlOl•B fighters had no nuclear warheads on the missiles with which they
were to attack Soviet bombers and the fifty-six Boma.ro missiles guarding
Canada 's heartland were useless because they, too, lacked atomic war28
heads.
The Canadian cabinet was hopelessly split because of the
nuclear weapons q\lestion, and three ministers, Douglas Harlmess, Pierre
Serlgny, and George Hees eventually resigned their cabinet posts because
21�. , pp. 33 8- 339 .

28Ibid., P •
34]..
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of Diefenbaker 's failure to obtain nuclear warheads for weapons which
Canada already owned. 29
The Diefenbaker government ' s failure to carry out its commitments
to obtain atomic warheads provided an issue for the Liberal opposition
led by Lester B . Pearson. Originally, Pearson had been an exponent of
a non-nuclear role for Canada, but diplo:raatic ( and political) considera
tions led him to change his mind. He regarded the verbal agreements
Canada ma.de with the United States as binding and stated :

"As a

Canadian, I am ashamed if we accept commitments and then refuse to dis

charge them. n 30

The debate in Canada continued for some time, and on January 30,

1963 the United States Department of State released a rather surprising
and controversial statement declaring:

"The Canadian government has not

yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute

effectively to North American defense . ,, 3l The American statement was
prompted by Canada ' s continued refusal to conduct negotiations toward
acquiring nu.clear weapons, but it was widely interpreted in Canada as
an attempt to meddle

Canadian internal politics because of the in
tense debate then going on in Canada. 32 One week af'ter the release at
in

�, 2e• cit. , P • 65 •
.31:ri,id., P • 64.

32Ibid.
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the statement the Diefenbaker government fell, and the nuclear weapons
question became a pa.ramunt issue in the election campaign which
featured the Diefenbaker Conservatives calling for increased independence
f'rom the United States and the Pearson Liberals appealing for co
operation with America. The Liberal Party won the election but only as
a minority government, and Prime Minister Pearson began negotiations
with the United States on the acquisition of' atomic warheads.

An

agree

ment was reached and went into effect before the end of' 196 3, but the
33
details of the agreement were not disclosed .
With the termination of the dispute between Canada and the United
States over the question of nuclear weapons, the most controversial issue
surrounding the North American Air Defense Comm.and was settled. Nonethe
less, other problems discussed earlier have not been completely
alleviated .

Yet it appears that Canadian and American policies in regard

to their mutual defense system have converged into one unified policy-
at least on the surface . Another crisis might bring forth other problems
in the future which are unforeseen at the present time. Nevertheless,
the past policies of the two countries regarding NORAD illustrate the
basic attitudes each holds toward foreign affairs in · the Cold War era
in general. The United States views the NORAD pact todq, as always, as
a necessary defense arrangement for the North American continent.

It is

not a Tery significant or well known defense pact as far as American
foreign policy is concerned, and it is far eclipsed in importance by

.33Ibid . ,

P• 6.5 .
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such alliances as NATO, SEATO, and the OAS . The United States continues
to regard the Soviet nuclear threat as real and for this reason desires
the continuation o! the present NORAD defense system .

Canada, on the

other hand, regards the Soviet nuclear threat in a much less serious
light and has continually sought ways of lessening Cold War tensions.
At times either significant segments of the Canadian population or the
Canadian government itself has looked upon NORAD as an unwanted and un
warranted threat to Canadian sovereignty , an invitation to involvement

in American wars, and a potential barrier to nuclear disarmament . None

theless, in the broader sense both countries have regarded the North
American Air Defense Command as a necessary defense pact for the Cold
War, and despite differences of opinion, it continues to exist .

CHAPTER IV
CUBA
Events in Cuba since the victorious revolution of Fidel Castro in
January, 19S 9 have been of great importance to both the United States
and Canada.

The Cuban issue was mentioned briefly in the NORAD pact dis

cussion earlier in reference to the 1962 missile crisis, but attitudes of
Canada and the United States toward Cuba go much deeper than what was
evidenced in the last few dqs of October, 1962.
Prior to 194S, Canadian foreign policy had for the most part

ignored all of Latin America.

"This was part� through the indifference

of most Canadians, part� through a preference for Commonwealth ties and
European cultural interests, and partly through the feeling that Latin
America was a United States sphere of interest in which it was better not
to interfere. • 1 Canada did not join the Organization 01' American States
because of the lack of rltal interests in South America and initial
opposition to Canadian membership on the part of the United States.

2

United States policies in regard to Latin .America in general dur
ing the Cold War period has continued mu.ch along traditional lines sup
ported by the Monroe Doctrine and supplemented with grants of foreign aid
\ichard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs :
(Toronto: Oxford University Press,19o5'J';-p. 175.
2
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in various forms and amounts. As with its foreign policy in general,

American Latin American policy was geared primarily toward the prevention
or communist takeovers 1n any Latin American nation.

The overthrov of a

leftist regime in Guatemala in 1954 which was engineered by the Central
Intelligence Agency serves as an excellent illustration of' this policy.
This overall situation of' American involvement and Canadian un
involvement still existed at the time or the Castro revolution.

In both

Canada and the United States, there was considerable sympathy f'or Fidel

Castro in the earl3 stages of' his revolutionary- activities . He was widely
regarded as a reformer as opposed to dictator Fulgencio Batista who was
tolerated but not particularl.1' well liked in either country of North

America.

Soon after gaining power, Castro visited the United States

where he was treated to great ovations and offered substantial amounts
or foreign aid.

The sympathetic attitude and assurances of support from

the United States did not prove to be long lasting, however. The execution
of' over six hundred Cuban political prisoners in 19591 the expropriation
without compensation of' an estimated one billion dollars worth of'

American-owned property, and a "perceptible gravitation toward the
Communist bloc" combined to change .American attitudes from sympathy to

outright opposition. 4 Relations between Cuba and the United States con

tinued to deteriorate in the summer and fall of' 1960 with the pronollllcements
3s&111Uel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People
(Hew York : Oxtord University Presa, 196S), p. 10�.hcecil V. Crabb ., Jr • ., American Foreign Policy ,!!! _!:!!! Nuclear �
( second edition; New York : Harper and Row, 1965), p. 292.

of friendship between the Soviet Union and Cuba against American
•imperialism" ; the extending of military aid to Cuba

b7
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communist states;

a United States-imposed trade embargo on Cuban products ; and the reduction
of the Cuban quota of sugar imported by the United States. 5 Finally, the
Eisenhower administration severed diplomatic relations with Cuba on
January 3, 1961; two years and two days after the accession to power of

Fidel Castro.

By the end of President Eisenhower' s term of office, the United

States had reached a decision to rid the hemisphere of Castro. The newly
installed Kennedy administration seconded the Eisenhower decision, and on
April 17, 1961, an American-trained and supported force of 1, 500 anti.
6
Castro Cuban exiles invaded the ;sland state at the Bay of Pigs. Halfhearted American efforts, faulty tactics, and decided:cy' inferior invasion
forces doomed the invasion to failure resulting in a serious diplomatic
defeat for the United States. 7 The military failure of the expedition
was grave enough but the unfortunate turn of events proved particularly

embarrassing in view of the Kennedy administration's public statements in
regard to the Cuban situation.

Both President Kenne<tr and the State De

partment had . maintained that the United States ' would take no part in any
military operation directed against the Castro government but that the
5Ibid., pp. 292-293.
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United States supported the aspirations of the Cuban people in their de
8
sire to rid their country of Castro ' s dictatorial regime.
This full cycle of American relations with Castro Cuba was not
followed by Canada. As in the United States, there was considerable
sympathy in Canada for Fidel Castro after his seizure of power on
January 1, 1959.

But since Canada, unlike the United States, was not

deeply involved in Cuban affairs either through political or economic

ties, it was not particular:cy- concerned with the events which took place
inside the country in the early period of Castro ' s rule.
ties with Cuba continued in the same manner

as

Its diplomatic

allRQ"S, and it mattered

little to Canada the methods used by Castro to gain power or the fate of
· his political opponents. 9 Cuban flirtations with the Soviet Union were
largely ignored by Canada in her dealings with Cuba.

Successive

nationalizations by the Castro government of foreign-owned propert;r--most
of which was American--had little effect upon Canada because Canadian
businessmen

had

invested very little in Cuba with the exception of

several banking and insurance companies. When the Cuban government

· issued the decrees of October 13 , 1960 nationalizing all fore ign-owned

banks, Canadian banks, with an estimated one hundred miilion dollars in
assets were purposely omitted from nationalization because the Castro

Bai.chard P. Stebbins (ed.), Documents on American Foreign
Relations , 1961 (lev Yorlc: Harper Brothers Company, 1962), pp. 455-456 .

9Edvard McWhinney, · 11Canadian-United s·ta tes Commercial Relations
and International Law, " Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. David
R. Deener (Durham, N. C. : Duke University- Press, 1963) , p. !40.

government "did not want to offend the Canadian government. 11 10 Thus,
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Canada was able to avoid, at least for the time being, the lossess which
investors in the United States and other countries suffered.

This Cuban

action toward Canadian interests was not taken because of arf3' love for
Canada but rather was intended to keep the door open to future trade
deals with Canada.
When the United States imposed an embargo on all trade with Cuba
except foodstuffs and medical supplies on October 19, 1960, in retalia
tion for the uncompensat�d Cuban expropriation of American-owned
property, Canad.a was faced with immediate problems of a delicate nature.
Because of her close trading ties with the United States, Canada could
render the American embargo almost useless by agreeing to trade goods

to Cuba which the latter could no longer obtain from the United States. 11
Discussions between the United States and Canada followed almost
immediately in which "the Canadian government from the first took the
stand that American goods covered by the embargo should not be allowed
to reach Cuba by way of Canada. n 12 This decision on Canada's part
should not be interpreted as an indication of that nation's agreement with
the American embargo.

John Holmes, a respected Canadian political

an�t and sometime Canadian government otticial, gave this view of
Canada's feelings in regard to the embargo and its usefulness:
1 0rbid. , P• 137.
�••ton, ..2E• �., p. 180.
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In the Canadian view, however, these embargoes are unwise and
unilateral. Canadians have been less inclined than Americana to
see the overthrow of communist regimes as a feasible aim and have
been more disposed, therefore, to hope that the beneficient in
fluence of connnerce would eventual'.13 erode barriers
create
on both sides vested interests in peaceful relations.

8i1

Despite the Canadian-United States discussions on the American
embargo and Canadian assurances that she would not serve as a go-between
!or American made products desired by Cuba, ill-feelings were generated
in both countries . A ten man Cuban trade mission headed by the Cuban
Minister of Econom.y, Regino Boti, arrived in (?ttawa in December, 1960 to
discuss the purchase by Cuba of an estimated $1$ 01 000, 000 worth of goods
from Canada on a cash basis. A wide range of iterns was desired mclud
ing:

"automotive and tractor spare parts, raw materials !or bottle manu

facturing, caustic soda, replacement parts for sugar mills, special types
of lubricants, and petroleum refinery- equipment. •14 Since much of this
purchase list was included in the American embargo, the trade discussions
were greeted with mixed feelings in the United States. As one American
official told the Toronto Globe and Mail on December

14,

1960, Canada

seemed "1*>re interested in making a few bucks than thwarting the Reds

in the Caribbean . n1' Fortunate'.q', the differences in trade policies
between the two North American countries did not approach serious

13John w. Holmes, "The Relationship in Alliance and in World
Affairs, " The United States and Canada, ed. John s . Dickey (Englewood
Clif'fs, N .J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1964), pp. 118-1�9 .
"ircWhirmey, �·
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proportions because Prime Minister Diefenbaker closed a:rry- possible gaps
which might haTe permitted Cuba to have obtained American-made products
from Canada . The Boti trade mission proposals were permitted to die,
and Canadian trade with Cuba actual.l1' declined rather than expanded in
the next year. 16
With the cessation of diplomatic relations between the United

States and Cuba on January 3, 1961, Canadian and American foreign poliq
again diverged.

The United States felt that such action was justified

and might, in £act, help to bring about the eventual downfall of the
Castro government.

The Canadian government, however, did not believe

that a break in relations was warranted and that such action would not
help bring about Castro' s downfall.

Canada was by no means happy over

Cuba's dealings with the communist bloc or its uncompensated expropria
tions which had, by this time, reached Canadian property; the lone ex
ception being Canadian-owned banks which were purchased by the Cuban

1
goTernm.ent. 7 But the Canadian government felt that Castro was not

entirely to blame £or his policies :
As both Mt-. Diefenbaker and the Canadian press suggested,
Canadian policy was based on the belief that Castro's drift
to Moscow had been at least partiail1' caused by a mistaken
American policy. It was thought th.at maintenance of normal
diplomatic and economic relations by C�ftda might help to
preserve some Cuban ties with the West .
16Ibid. , p. ]Jµ..

17Preston, �· _ill., PP• 180-181 .
18Ibid., p. 180.
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Edward McWhinney, a professor at the University of Toronto, feel�
that this difference in approach toward diplomatic relations with Cuba
by the two nations is a result of differences in legal traditions rather
than isolated policy decisions:
American international law doctrine ., much more than Canadian,
which is more essential� English-derived, so often combines
essent� pragmatist-based positions with strong doses of
natural law thinking . The normative type propositions ., for
example, found in what we might call "American" intemational
law attitudes--the Stimson doctrine or the duty of non-recognition
of international situations brought about by "illegal" use of
force, invoked so often in cormection with American thinking on
such matters as the issue of recognition or non-recognition have
no strict counterparts or parallels in the inttvi•tional law
doctrine of the Conunonwealth countries per se .
Thus, some have argued that Canada., 1n addition to believing that
the United States was not justified in breaking relations with Cuba,
utilized an international law policy quite different from that of the
United States in that it gave little consideration to questions of
international morality in maintaining diplomatic relations with another
government.

This particular argument put forth by McWhinney and others

as a reason for Canadian recognition of the Castro regime has had its
exceptions for Canada in other parts of the globe, however, as will

be

indicated later in this study.
The break in relations between the United States and Cuba was soon
followed in April by the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.

This contro

versial expedition has been mch discussed in the United States since

19
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its occUITence, and the consensus of opinion is that for various reasons
it was a very poor operation on the part of this country.

In Canada the

event was, likewise, widely publicised and debated, but the government,
possibly in deference to its neighbors to the south, chose to sq little

public l3 on the subject. It was clearly anxious to avoid embarrassing
the United States. 20 Prime Minister Diefenbaker made the following
statement on April 19, 1961, outlining Canada ' s position on the Cuban
situation :
It is now clear the situation in Cuba is mch more than a
continuation of the original internal revolution • • • •
Cuba has become ti:ie focal point of an ideological contest •
• • • In our country we cannot be indifferent io this danger
which affects the hemisphere in which we live. 2
This statement actually brought the Diefenbaker government a long way
toward agreeing with the American position that Cuba was plqing the
role of a Soviet satellite in the Western hemisphere and that it was
the base tor subverting other free nations in the area. A statement

released by the State Department on April 3 1 1961, just before the Bq

of Pigs invasion, gave the United States position on the Castro government :

What began as a movement to enlarge Cuban democracy and free
dom has been perverted, in short, into a mechanism for the_
destruction of free institutions in Cuba, for the seizure by
international communism of a base and bridgehead in the Americas
and £or the disruption of the inter-American system.

20John T. Sqwell, Canadian Annual Review for 1961 (Toronto :
-University of' Toronto Press, 1962) 1 P• 12S.
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It is the considered judgment or the Government of the United
States of America that the Castro regime :in Cuba offers a clear
and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of
the Americas--to the whole hope of spreading political liberty,
economic development., and social progress through all the re
publics or the hemisphere. 22
Thus ., while Canada did not give official support to the Bq of
Pigs operation ., its general poliey- -at least � regard to its assessment
of that country as a potential comnnmist threat--became more similar to
the policy or the United States. Considerable debate followed within
the House or Commons and the cabinet and also in the news media, but
aside from the public statement given by Prime Minister Diefenbaker, all
other comnnmications between the United States and Canada were of an un
publicized nature on the diplomatic levei. 23
An interesting result or the Bay of Pigs episode :f'rom the Canadian
standpoint has been that the controversial event ., as well as the Panama
Canal riots and the Dominican Republic turmoil, has been pointed to by
many Canadians as proof that Canada should remain outside the Organiza
tion or American States to prevent that country from becoming embroiled
in diplomatic predicaments which might require the condemnation of the
United States. 24
The Bq of' Pigs episode ended with Canada and the United States

in general agreement on the potential threat posed by Cuba as a conmmnist
22Stebbins, �· cit. , P• 8.
43
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satellite in the Western hemisphere. Yet Canada was not prepared to
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take any action towards countering this threat as the . United States had
in such areas as diplomatic relations, the embargo, and undercover aid
to anti-Castro Cuban refugees. From the period following the Bay of
Pigs invasion to the Cuban ·missile crisis of October, 1962, nothing of'
significance occurred which ma.teria.ll.3 affected the foreign policy of'
either country-.
The Cuban missile crisis which public:cy, began with President
Kennedy' s nationwide television speech of October 22, 1962, brought renewed strains between Canada and the United States in connection with the
Cuban problem.

These differences arose not onl1' over Cuban policy in general

but also revolved about Canadian and United States defense arrangements.
The United States viewed the importation of' long range missiles
and ll-28 bombers into Cuba by the Soviet Union as being in violation of'
the Monroe Doctrine and as posing a direct threat not onq to Latin
American nations but to the United States as well.

Both weapons were of

an offensive character and possessed nuclear capabilities.

The medium

range ballistic missiles· had a range enabling them to strike targets as
f'ar north as Hudson I s Bay and as far south as Lima, Peru.
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Clearly, the

entire hemisphere was placed in danger .
In order to prohibit the permanent introduction of' these weapons
into Cuba, the United States undertook several actions.

American naval

units initiated a blockade of Cuba to bar ships from delivering more of
2S.r1son, �· �. ,
P• lll7.
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these weapons , and American forces at Guantanom.o Bay naval base in Cuba
were reinforced. Emergency meetings were called ot the Organization of
American States and

the

United Nations Security Council. Soviet Premier

Nikita Khrushchev was warned that it would be American policy nto regard

arrr

nuclear missile launched from Cuba against

any

nation in the Western

hemisphere as an attack ·by the Soviet Union on the United States , re

quiring a full retaliatory response up on the Soviet Union. n 26 Along with
this warning went the ttrequest" to remove all offensive weapons already
in Cuba. For several days a tense world awaited the showdown between the

United States and the Soviet Union which was expected to de"Yelop when
.American naval blockade forces would· have to halt Russian freighters
delivering weapons to Cuba.

The United States presented its case before

the Security Council with an extraordinary display of' photographs taken
b;y reconnaissance planes, and the Organization of American States , by
unanimous vote on October 23, "demanded the immediate and total dis
mantling of comnamist missiles in Cuba and called upon its members to
resist, by force ii' necessary, &rt3" further Cuban importation of com
munist arms . • 27
It was not until. October 27 that the crisis eased. On that

date

the Soviet freighters bo1md for Cuba turned around and headed back to
the U.

s . s.

R. , and Premier Khrushchev sent a conciliatory note to

President Kennedy- indicating he wished to avoid provocations against

26Gerberding, 21?.• �. , p . 274.
27crabb, .5!2• �. , P• 294.
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the United States and would withdraw the missiles and n-28 bombers
from Cuba.

On

November 20, President Kenned;r announced that all com

munist missiles 1n Cuba ·had been dismantled and were being removed, and
.
the American naval blockade or the island was being lifted. 28
During the crisis the United States received considerable support
from its allies around the world who, whether they agreed with America's
general Cuban policy or not, wanted to declare their support for the

United States in what appeared to be a possible showdown confrontation
29 Canada however, whose interests coincided
with the communist ·world.
.,
most closeq of all

with

those of the United States·, procrastinated in

determining its course of action in the crisis.

Prime Minister John

Diefenbaker failed to grant immediate permission for American planes
to move forward to bases at Goose Bay., Labrador, and Stephenville,
Newfoundland, or to make flights over Canadian territory after being
urgent� requested. to do so several hours before President Kenned;r' s
dramatic speech of October 22, 1962. The reason he later gave for his
refusal was based on the failure of the United States to consult with

the Canadian government about the proposed course of action as specified
by the North American ilr Defense Command agreement.

30

The Royal

Canadian Air Force contingents under NORAD were not permitted to come up

29oerberd.1ng, �·

ill• .,

P • 2 74.

3 0peter c. Newman, Renegade in Power : The Diefenbaker Years
(Nev York : Bobbs-Merrill Company, 'inc • ., 1963 )., p . 3)9.
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to the necessary alert status until amost two days had passed in the
crisis ., and even after these forces had been put on alert, obstacles
were placed in the way of the United States in its attempts to provide
adequate protection for the North American c·ontinent.

The Strategic

Air Command which reportedly' had requested permission to make 640 over
flights of nuclear-armed bombers over Canadian territory finally was
allowed to make only- eight such flights. 31
This failure of Canada to act in a crisis situation which could
have affected her just as much as it could the United States might well
have had disastrous results if an actual conflict had developed with the
Soviet Union.

Fortunateq such a situation did not occur., but Canada's

initial delay in cooperating with the United States was not reassuring
for the latter and had repercussions in Canada, as discussed earlier,
with the fall of Prime Minister Diefenbaker ' s government being the end
product.
During the crisis itself ., Diefenbaker ' s cabinet was split badl,1'
on what action to take. Howard Green, then Minister of Extern.al Affairs,
urged a policy of no cooperation whatsoever with the United States with
an emotional cry for Canadian independence.

Douglas Harkness, the De

fense Minister, spoke out for supporting American actions in the crisis.
Diefenbaker initially took Green ' s position, but three days later altered
his stand and stated in the House of Co:mmns:

"So

that the attitude of

the government will be clearly understood, we intend to support the

-

3 1Ib1d ., P• 340.
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United States and our allies in this situation. •3 2 However, the damage
had alread;y been done to Diefenbaker and his government, and his later
words rang somewhat hollow in light of his early- actions. His govem
ment eventually- fell as a result of' the Cuban missile crisis and its
related issues, and after the general elections Diefenbaker joined
the opposition instead of the government.
Since the missile crisis of October, 1962 there has been little

conflict between United States · and Canadian foreign policy in regard to

the Cuban

situation.

No incidents have arisen which have altered sig

nificantly the policies of either of the two governments.

The United States

still has no diplomatic relations with Cuba and a trade embargo continues
in effect except for certain medical supplies which are. permitted to go
to Cuba as always. The United States has publicl.Jr refused to permit
anti-Castro Cubans from launching attacks against the island, and
throughout 1966

has

maintained an airlift between Cuba and Florida to

bring Cuban refugees to this country.

Canada continues to engage in some

trade with Cuba but such trade is not great and is limited to items not
embargoed by' the United States. In 196�, the total trade between the two
nations amounted to approximately- $64, 000, 000 worth of goods. 33 Canada
also continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Castro regime.

The earq differences of opinion between the United States and Canada
3 2 Ibid., P• 339 •
.33c. J. Harris (ed. ), Quick Canadian Facts (Toronto : Thorn
Press, 1965 ), P • 86.
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regarding Cuba polic7 have not been entire� overcome, but the status
quo methods of handling the regime of Fidel Castro will no doubt
accepted by both nations until some meaningful event occurs which
signif'icantq alters the Cuban question.

be

CHAPTER V
THE NORTH ATIANTIC 'l'REATY ORGANI ZATION
The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in A.pril,

1949 marked the beginning of a new and vital issue in the field of

foreign affairs for both the United States and Canada.

Since NATO's

formation the European foreign policies of both nations have been

determined, to a large extent, by alliance considerations .

Prior to

NATO, Canada's policies in Europe were carried out in conjunction with
those of' Great Britain to a considerable degree. As an influential

member of the Commonwealth, it had taken Great Britain's lead in dealing

with the European states, and a strict'.cy Canadian policy had not yet
evolved. 1
The United States, in the years between the end of World War II

and the formation of' NATO, had directed a considerable portion of its

imagination and resources toward rebuilding Europe, and in response to
the Soviet threat it had dropped its traditional pre-war policy of

isolationisa.

It viewed a free Western Europe as being a prerequisite

for preserving a free United States.

The Marshall Plan, the Berlin Air

lift, the Vandenburg Resolution, and President Truman's Point Four

Program all were indications of America's strong interest and involvement
in Western Europe and served as antecedents for United States melllbership

1Melvin Conant, "Canada's Role in Western Defense, " Foreign
Affairs, n (April, 1962 ), 432.433 .
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in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nonetheless, even with this

previous involvement in European affairs, the formation ot NATO has been
regarded by many as the point of departure for the new American policy
in Europe.
Both Canada and the United States were instrumental in bringing
about the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Canadian leaders were probably the first to propose the idea of setting
up such an organization.

They viewed it as a positive way of helping to

create a prosperous, viable Europe capable of countering comuamist sub
version or invasion.

On June ll, 1948, the very day the United States

Senate was approT.ing the Vandenburg Resolution urging the nation to
underwrite the costs of collective defense arrangements under the United
Nations Charter., Prime Minister St. Laurent was telling the Canadian
House of Commons:
The best guarantee of peace today' is the creation and preserva
tion by the nations of the free world, under the leadership of
Great Britain, the United States ., and France, of an overwhelming
preponderance of force over any adversary or possible combination
of adversaries. This force mu.st not only be military; it must be
economic; it must be moral. 2
In addition to protecting Europe, however ., Canada viewed a strong North
Atlantic communit7 as a great aid in maintaining Canadian independence

from the United States which, even prior to 1949, had grown progressive:cy
3
more influential in Canada as Great Britain grew weak:er.
2w. E. c. Harrison ., Canada in World Affairs:
Oxford University Press, 1957), p.22.

1949- 1950 (Toronto :

3John w. Holmes, "Canada in Search of Its Role, 11 Foreign Affairs,
XLI (JuJ.7, 1963 ) ., 121.
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The United States desire in establishing NATO, of course, was not
influenced in any way by a need to offset Canadian influence in American
affairs.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a radio speech on March 18,

1949, outlined the American desire for a NATO pact:
We have learned our history lessons from two world wars in less
than half a century-. That experience has taught us that the con
trol of Europe by a single, unfriendly power would constitute an
intolerable threat to the national security of the United States.
We participated in these two great wars to preserve the integrity
and independence of the European half of the Atlantic community
in order to pr�serva the integrity and independence of the
American half.
Secretary Acheson went on to state that the Atlantic pact was a collective
self-defense arrangement ttaimed at coordinating the exercise of the right
of self defense especia� recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. •5 The United States viewed NATO, therefore, as not supplanting
the United Nations as some people feared at the time but rather comple
menting the organization and giving the international order some tangible
support in an area of vital concern.
It is interesting to note how close Canadian and American policy
coincided on both the importance of Europe to North American defense and
the supplementary role which NATO would p]JQr to the United Nations with
in Article 51 of the Charter.

In discussing the need for the alliance,

Prime Minister St. Laurent stressed Europe' s importance to North America
in mu.ch the same manner as �ecretary of State Acheson :

1asct.rarc1

Reed, Readings for Democrats (New York :
tions, Inc . , 1960), p. 167.
.Sibid., p. 186.

Oceana Publica
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We in Canada also recognize that there is neither peace nor
security .for Canada if Western Europe, quite as nm.ch as any part
o.f this hemisphere, is in danger; but we .feel that, by uniting our
efforts, by making our intentions clear, by making our preparations
serious, and by' .forcing the totalitarian rulers or the Communist
states to realize that we mean business, we are not· contracting
our strength but expanding it. 6
Like the United States, Canada .felt that NATO was sanctioned
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter . St. Laurent again
stated :

"Without sacrificing the universality of the United Nations, it

is possible for the free nations o.f the world to .form their own closer
association for collective salt-defense under Article 51 or the Charter
of the United Nations. n 7

Canada., as the United States, had come to realize that the United
Nations alone could not provide the final answer for solving all the
world' s problems--at least the maj or ones or the Cold War--and felt that
NATO was a necessity in preserving Western freedom. Both countries
shared an equal desire to see NATO provide security for an area which
each placed primary' importance on, and their attitudes in this respect
were similar. Canada, however, wanted the NATO alliance .for the
additional reason of partia.lq offsetting American influence in Canada.
This second .factor favoring Canadian mem.ber�hip � NATO has proven to
be of vital importance in Canada' s relations with the North Atlantic
alliance since 1949.
'sarrison., El?• cit. , P• 24.
7 Donald c. Masters, Canada in World Affairs :
Oxford Uni�ersity Press, 19S9) ., p.18).

1953-1955 (Toronto :

Since the beginning, the NATO alliance has been an unequal
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partnership between the United States on the one hand and the other four
teen member nations on the other .

Overwhelming American power, both

nuclear and conventional, determined this aspect of the pact.
not to say that the United States has alv,qs been

in

Th.is is

opposition to the

policies and objectives of the other members or NATO for such has
definitely not been the case. But a preponderance of American power and
al.most total nuclear m.onopoq gave to the United States the major
decision-making role

in

the alliance.

Canada, on the other hand, has

not been an influential member of the organization. Even though Canada
is a North American nation, it has allied itself genera.lly- either with
Britain or, more often, with the smaller European states of NATO.
Significantly, it has collaborated

with

the smaller European members in

resisting all proposals for a great power directorate. 8 In addition,

Canada has found in NATO the security of numbers which it could not hope
to find in a strict:cy, bilateral pact

with

America . 9 NATO has assured

Canada an opportunity to participate in making decisions which might
otherwise have been determined in Washington without consulting Canada

or taking her interests into account. 10

8c . P. Stacey, •Twenty-one Years or Military Co-operation, "
Canada-United States Treffl Relations, ed . David R. Deener (Durham., N. C. :
Duke University Press, 1 3 ), P • 127 •
. 9Fred Alexander � Canadians and Foreign Policy (Toronto :
University Press, 1960) 1 p. 34.
10Ibid. ,
P• 13 1.

Toronto
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These purely Canadian reasons for membership in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization may appear strange to Americans who have
never experienced the problem of cont:inualq needing to assert their
independence from foreign influence as a nation- and as a people.

Yet,

when one examines Canadian history, particularq that of the recent Cold
War era, Canada's attitudes in regard to NATO coincide closeq
general foreign poliey and its relationship

with

with

its

the United States.

Canadian membership in NATO has demonstrated that country' s wish to com
bat the spread of international communism., but it also has signified her
intentions ot retaining some ties with Mother England and, _to a limited
degree,

with

France and, in addition, of using continental Europe as a

counterweight to .American power and influence. The years since 1949
indicate that Canada has followed this course of action consistentl..1', but
its degree or success is rather difficult to ascertain .

Canada's voice

in NATO has never been very signif'icant, and decisions have been made in
the organization regardless of Canada's acceptance or rejection of them.
NATO has helped to maintain Canadian ties with Great Britain and France,
but on this side of the Atlantic American influence

in

Canada has

in

creased rather than decreased as complaints from many Canadian quarters
indicate.
From the J.merican Tiewpoint it is difficult to describe
Atlantic Treaty Organization as anything but a success.

the

North

In its early'

years it was responsible in large part for preventing a eomnmnist take
over ot Western Europe, which was the most

vital

objective of United

States foreign policy . Along with this objective the alliance played

a key role in the rebuilding of Western Europe into the second most
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prosperous area or the world, thus ending its reliance upon large
amotmts of American financial and technical assistance. Over the long
term NATO has also contributed to less rivalry and to closer cooperation
among Westem European nations in spite of the current disruptive
policies of President Charles De Gaulle.

Such organizations as the

Europea n Economic Community and Euratom have been able to function

be

cause of the favorable ataosphere in Europe--created to a large degree
by NATO .

In general, NATO has been a successful instrument or American

foreign policy, although events of recent years have shown that some of
the more specific aims of United States foreign policy have been less
successful within the alliance.
The same evaluation of NAT0 1 s overall success holds true from
Canada I s vie11p0int also. As indicated earlier, Cana.da was interested,
juat as was the United States, in preserving Western European freedom,
11
building up its econonv, and reducing inner tensions and distrusts.
It is with the specific objectives and methods of NATO that Canada has
not always

been

satisfied--sometimes for quite opposite reasons than

the United States.

Undoubtec::l:cy,, one of the most persistent problems facing the NATO
alliance, and one which affects it serious:q, at present, is the method
of leadership ·of the organization.

The NATO Secretary-General in con

junction with the Secretariate; the Foreign Ministers • Conference every
l

¾w. ters, �· cit., pp. 18 4-18$ .
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six months; the NATO parliamentary sessions every _ year; the Standing
Group; and the Committee on Political Advisors have all been instruments
established at one time or another as compromise means of making NATO
policy.

Sil}.ce 19.50, however, regardless of these altemate devices, the

chief polic7-maldng office has been that of the Supreme Allied Commander,
12
Europe .
This position of power has always been held by an American by
virtue of the overwhelming milita.17 power of the United States.

By

holding this position in conjunction with its military capabilities, the
United States has been able to exercise significant and, in many cases,
controlling authority over NATO policy. This dominance of NATO is deter
mined to a

veey

considerable degree by .American nuclear power, and the

two important issues of control over NATO and control over its nuclear
arsenal are, in actual�ty, the same problem.

This predominance of

American power and its guarantee to this country of a commanding voice
in the Atlantic pact has been much to the advantage of the United States.
In the 1960 1 s United States domination has been challenged in
various ways by several of the member states of the alliance,

with

France being only" the most outstanding example. · In an attempt to
assuage the sensitivities of the other members of ·NAT0 1 the United
States

has

cooperated in the various efforts to broaden the decision

makin� processes of the alliance. The Mu.ltilateral Nuclear Force (MLF)
idea first proposed under the Eisenhower administration and expanded
12Michael Curtis Westem European Integration (New York :
.,
Harper and Row ., Inc • ., 1965)., pp. 78�79.

upon by President Kennedy is the most recent and best known attempt to
1
give more voice to the other fourteen NATO members. 3 These various
efforts to increase the role of the other m�mbers have been founded on
the desire of the United States to maintain some control over its
nuclear veapons--both for political reasons and the legal requirement in
the form of' the 1946 McMahon Act and its 1958 amendments restricting the

dissemination of atomic information and weaponry. 14 Some tactical

weapons with nuclear capabilities, such as the Honest John and Corporal
guided missiles, eight inch howitzers, and jet aircraft, have been
supplied to other NATO countries .

The nuclear warheads for these

weapons, however, as well as all long range missiles and strategic
15
bombers, have been kept under American control.
Great Britain, in

1965, turned its strategic bomber force over to NATO command. These

actions have not been enough to satisfy France, which has undertaken
�e task of developing its own n�clear f'orce--the force de frappe.

The

MIF proposal has since been discarded because of the opposition of
France and some of the smaller NATO members--m&ny' ot whom fear the
prospect of West Oerm&n7 1 s having a voice
16
nuclear weapons.

l3w:uuam

in

any- decision to use

P. Gerberding, United States Fore
i}licz: Perapectbee
!!!,g .Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1fl
96 , p. 244.
l4Ibid. ' p. 245.

lSCurtis, ..2E • cit., P• BS .
16
�., P • 89.

56
With the rejection of the MLF proposals, the United States has
refrained from introducing any more alternatives to the present method
of running the alliance . Even though the current arrangement is re
garded as unsatisfactory by so many members, the present involvement of
the United States in Vietnam; the chauvinistic attitude of France; and
the Soviet pre-occupation

with

internal and eastern matters, mediates

against any ear� solution to the problem of developing a new and work

able form of policy-making organ for the NATO alliance.
Canada has not played a decisive role in these attempts at giving
the other NATO members a greater share of the decision-making power, but
it should be noted that Lester B. Pearson, in his various roles through
the years, has been an important personality in NATO out of proportion
to what would normally be expected from a representative of Canada.
First and foremost, Canada has been an uncompromising proponent of the
NATO alliance. Above all other· issues affecting the North Atlantic
region, it views the preservation of the NATO pact as a necessity•
especial:cy, 'When either the North American or the European end appears to
be

on a "go it alone" path. . As far back as 1954, Mr. Pearson, as

Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated:

The continuing cohesion of all the Atlantic powers, not mere:cy
the European powers, is vital.lJ" important to the preserving and
re-inf'orc:ing of the peace of the world and no security and no
stability can be achieved through isolated arrangements, either
in North America or in Europe. Continentalis:ra, whether ¥f the
European or American variety, is not enough for saf'ety. 1

17

Masters, �· cit., P • 185.

S7
This Canadian desire to keep NATO together as an effective
alliance system rather than as a continental or diversified multi-state
defense system with no joint defense planning has been illustrated in
the debate over German membership in 19$4 and 19SS ., the Suez Invasion or
19$6 ., the Cuban Crisis of 1962 ., and to some degree in the last three

years when NATO has been faced with severe internal problems. Both
Prime Minister Pearson at the NATO Council meeting in Mq., 1963 and
Paul Martin ., Secretary or State for Extemal Affairs ., in a speech in
Cleveland on March 4, 196S ., reaffirmed Canada ' s deep desire to see NATO

remain intact and, in fact ., join even closer together into a true
Atlantic community. 18 Thus, at a time when the United States and other
NATO members were embroiled in controversy over the more specific prqb
lems facing the organization ., Canada was not onl,1- pleading the case for
unity above all else in the alliance ., but al� o for the creation of an
actual community spanning the Atlantic, which would unite the member
states in something more than a simple military alliance.
Even in the case of Canada ., however ., doubts appear to have arisen

recent:cy- over the f�ture direction of NATO because of the actions of

France.

fllese doubts do not reflect a fundamental change of Canadian

attitude but, instead, indicate that Canada wishes to do what is best
and most practical for the organization in its present state.

This new

attitude was brought out in a speech by Prime Minister Pearson to the
18Paul Martin "Canada and the Atlantic Community, " External
.,
Affairs ., XVII (April, 1965), 124.
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Canada Club in ottawa on Febru&rT 10, 1965 , when he stated :

We DDJ.St now re-examine the principles on which the Atlantic
Alliance was follllded 16 years ago. The best result would be to
come closer together, organicalq, on the old Treaty basis. But
that is impossible at the moment if we wish to include the France
of General De Gaulle. And, certainly', in Canada it is impossible
to contemplate an Atlantic coalition without France.
ilternativeq, we mq have to consider new arrangements by
which Europe takes responsibility for the security of one side ot
the Atlantic, North America for the other, with interloeking o
operative arrangements for mutual assistance against attack. 19

For Canada the prospects of utilizing this alternate plan would be
particularly displeasing because her voice would be alone in seeking
to influence United States policies on this side of the Atlantic,
whereas she has had numerous allies under the present set-up.

Thus

Canada Jll81' well find that the very instrument which had saved her from
undue American influence might, indeed, eventually consign her to this
unwanted fate.
When specific ideas are considered for solving the problems of
nuclear control and decision-making authority, Canada has had no more
success than other members of the alliance.

She opposed the creation

of another triumvirate or "'l'hree Wise Men" in 1956 because the first
triumvirate had been rather ineffective, and the then recent Suez
Crisis had indicated that a triumvirate system of the type envisioned
would be incapable of getting the larger powers in NATO to consult with
the a;:Lliance as a whole. 20 Canada also expressed opposition to the idea
l9tester B. Pearson, "The Face of the World in 1965, " External
Affairs, XVII (March, 1965 ) , 84 .
20James Eqrs, Canada in World Affairs :
Oxf�rd University Press, 1959T; P • 72.

1955-19$7 (Toronto :
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proposed b.r the United States and Great Britain at the Atlantic Congress
in 1959 that certain decisions of the NATO Council should

be

adopted by

less than unanimous vote. The idea was to make the Council a more
decisive organization, but to smaller nations such as Canada the
proposal seemed to hint at a centralization of power under big power
domination. 21 The December, 1960 proposal of General De Gaulle to create
an inner cabinet or triumvirate composed of the United States, Great
Britain, and France to act as the decision-making authority over all
NATO matters was rejected by Canada as more big power domination and
could upset the Canadian government's hope to •preserve the fundamental
character of NATO as an association of equals." 22 While Canada was
opposed to these early suggestions toward solving the NATO dilemma, she
did not appear to have a specific solution to the problem herself. �ther
than the creation of a genuine Atlantic commu.nity--an alternative which
had failed to gain mu.ch support among the other members. Canada desired
a greater voice in NATO affairs--nuclear and non-nuclear--and more con

sultation within the alliance, but did not want big power directorates

or binding obligations to support NATO decisions
or outside NATO jurisdiction.

in

matters either inside

Mr. Howard Green, Canadian Minister of

External Affairs, summarized his country' s feelings in a speech before
the House of Commons

in

December, 1960 regarding NATO jurisdiction in

2L liichard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs :
Oxford University Press, 1965), P• 194.-

22�. , P• 197 .

1959-1961 (Toronto :
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areas outside its treat7-defined limits :
Canada's opinion is that nations should be informed of the
views of the other members of the alliance with regard to prob
lemB arising in these areas, but we have never agreed that there
should be consultation in the sense of creating an obligation on
the part o •Jlber countries with regard to areas outside the
NATO area. 3

1

In regard to NATO decisions within the organization 1 s geographic
lind.ts of jurisdiction, Canada's position was not stated quite so ex
plicit]J', but its hints at not wanting to be bound by "pre-tixed
positions" or other than unanimous votes of the NATO Council were
sufficient to indicate that even Canada was not prepared to see a
system evolve in NATO which would bind that country" too close]J' to the
decisions of the alliance members as a whole.
The idea of the Multilateral Nuclear Force proposed by' the United
States to give the other NATO members somewhat more control over nuclear
weapons while at the same time retaining United States custody of the
warheads, was not received by' Canada as the panacea for NATO's internal
problems by' any means.

Canadian statements relating to the MLF proposal

were, in fact, rather ambiguous ; seeming to neither endorse nor veto the
idea completei,,, but lea'Ving the matter open to further discussion .

The

most conclus�ve statement came from Secretary of State for External
Affairs Paul Martin on December 23, 1964, when he said:

"We do not be

lieve th.at the proposals concerning the creation ot a multilateral
23
Ibid. , P • 198.
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nuclear force ., taken by- themselves ., are capable of solving the whole of
this problem. u 2 4 Canadian policy concerning the MLF thus tended toward
the negative unless additional but always unspecified improvements were
made. Since no worthwhile improvements were offered to supplement the
original MLF concept., Canada was not particularly disappointed when the
controversial proposal was shelved.

The issue of control over nuclear weapons and their targeting was ·
further complicated for a number of years from the Canadian standpoint
because the Conservative government of Jolm Diefenbaker did not want to
accept atomic weapons.

Thus ., during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 .,

when the Canadian CF-lOlB fighters and Bomarc missiles under NORAD were

rendered useless because they lacked nuclear warheads, so also were the

Canadian CF-104 interceptors and Honest John missiles under NATO useless
25
for the very same reason .
As discussed in an earlier chapter ., the
reasons for this lack of nuclear armament on weapons systems specifically
designed for such armament included Canada' s desire to act as an arbiter
and •shining example" in any disarmament negotiations and also reflected

· that country ' s attitude of leaving the nuclear weapons arsenal with its
expense and obligations in the hands of the United States.
The refusal by Canada to accept atomic weapons for its units in

24p..111 Martin, Canada and the International Situation Information
.,
Division, Department of External Affairs, Circular 6W36 (ottavat
Department of External Affairs, 1964) ., p. 4 .

2SJames Eqrs, 11Sharing a Continent : The Hard Issues, " The United
States and Canada, ed. John S. Dickey- (Englewood Cli.tfs, N. J. :--isrenticeHall, Inc • ., 1964), p. 64.
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NATO left the organization with definite weak points in the defense

screen wherever Canadian units were assigned. General Lauria Norsted,
the American supreme commander of NATO, visited Ottawa, Canada, on

January 3, 1963 at a time when the debate over Canada's position on
nuclear weapons was intense.

He confirmed that Canada had., indeed,

made an oral agreement to equip both its NATO (and NORAD) forces with
nuclear weapons. Since Canada had failed so far to equip its fighter
squadrons in Europe with the agreed weapons, it was his opinion that
Canada had not met NATO requirements. 26 With the NATO situation being
tied so close� to that of NORAD ., the debate within the Canadian govern
ment tended to consider the two issues as one. The Department of Ex
ternal Affairs, headed by Howard Green ., took the anti-nuclear weapons
position and the Defense Department under Douglall Harkness took the
pro-nuclear weapons position. The latter actual� worked in close
harnt0ny with the Pentagon, and its opinions coincided with those of the
United States on the question of Canada's possession of nuclear weapons
within the NATO organization. 27 The issue was finall)" resolved after
the Pearson government came to power in .lpril, 1963 .

Canadian units

assigned to NATO were supplied with atomic warheads (under American
custody) for the weapons systems they already possessed.

26

Gerald Clark, Canada: The Uneasy Neighbor (New York : David
McKq Company, 196S ), p. 77.
27
Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power : The Diefenbaker Years
(Bew York : Bobbs-Merrill Comp8IJ1'., Inc., 1963 ), p. 341.

6.3
The current crisis in NATO has affected both the United States
and Canada to a considerable degree.

As leader of the alliance, the

United States cannot fail to be particularl.3' concerned with the divisive
situation threatening the alliance. Yet, United States involvement in
the Vietnamese war has directed American attention to an area far removed
from NATO considerations with the result that alliance considerations
have been at least temporarily surpassed in importance
difficulties.

bf Far

Eastern

The rebirth of nationalism in nm.ch of Western Europe is

likewise a force the United States seens unable to counter.

It threatens

not only American leadership but the future of the alliance itself'.

The

relaxed mood of most European countries brought about b;r their reeent]3
acquired affluence and the likewise recent belief that the Soviet threat
is rapid:cy, receding has also made it extreme]3 difficult for the United.
States to mold NATO policy in accord with its own needs and desires. 28
The obvious but unannounced American policy in regard to NATO in the
last two years has been tantamount to a "hold-the-line" policy gauged
to preserve the alliance intact until the United States can once again
turn its attention to NATO affairs unburdened with pressing considerations

elsewhere.

I'.

Canadian policy, like that of the United States, has been one of

attempting to prevent the dissolution of the organization in the face of
the various internal and external pressures acting against it.

28

"Europe ' s New Mood--Its Meaning for
World Report, LI (June 20, 1966 ) , .39 .

u. s . , " u. s .

Unlike

News �
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the United States ., Canada is not the target or European emotionalism and
thus can operate more effectively- as a mediation force. Yet Canada . has
been no more success:f'ul than any other nation in finding solutions to
NATO ' s difficulties ., and the crisis confronting NATO appear� to be far
too much for any single country to hope to ameliorate.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has served well the
interests of both the United States and Canada.

It has first and fore

most helped to preserve the freedom of both nations by- preventing the
communist conquest or Western Europe and by helping to rebuild the
devastated economies of the continent. The United States has been able
to exert its own European policies through the NATO alliance by virtue
of its immense power, and thus the organization has served as a useful
instrument of American diplomacy. Canada, while unable to exert such
tremendous influence upon Europe by reason of its NATO membership has,
nonetheless, been able to maintain close ties vi th the area and in so .
doing partial'.q offset the influence of the United States within Canada
itself.
The important goals which each North American country aought to
attain through NATO, while not always the same, have been achieved to a
considerable degree-the possible exception being Canada ' s attempt to
counter American influence with closer ties with Western Europe which
has met with only limited success. From the standpoint of both countries .,
NATO must be considered an overall success ., albeit not in the 100 per
cent category or in some of the more specific issues which haTe come
before the organization. Current NATO proble• bode ill for both
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countries in the future, but past benefits al.rea<i1' have proven
sufficient to justify the formation of the alliance.

CHAPTER VI
THE QUESTION OF CHINA
The China problem has been a source of contin11:al aggravation for
both the United States and Canada since the 194 9 victory of Mao Tse-tung 1 s
communist forces over those of the nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek.

For the United States this communist victory- represented a serious set
back after a hundred years of American involvement of V&ry'ing degrees in
Chinese affairs. While this involvement was initial� brought about by
the United States for commercial reasons, the twentieth century gradually
brought with it a new attitude resulting in considerable .American sym1
pat.by for and aid to China. Mao I s revolution thus seemed to many
Americans to be a rather strange way of expressing China' s friendship and
appreciation to the United States.

The fact that this break between

friends occurred a brief four years after the two countries had achieved
victory over a common foe following years of close alliance and mutual
2
assistance proved all the more difficult for Americans to understand.
Unlike the United States·, Canada had had very little contact with China
historically, and had participated on only' a very limited scale during
the war in the Pacific with virtually' no contact with the Chinese.

In

1A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of th� United States
(Ifev Haven : Yale University Press;-1938), p. 338. - -2Robert A. Devine (ed. ), American Foreign Policy (New York :
Meridian Books, Inc., 1960), P• 273 .
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examining the policies of the two countries in regard to the China prob
lem during the Cold War ., the dif'fe�ent relationships of the two nations
with China prior to the communist conquest should not be forgotten.
A.merican· aid to China was suspended in November ., 1949 with the
ouster of Chiang Kai-shek 1 s forces from the mainland to their redoubt
on the island of Formosa. All military assistance ., however ., had been
severely' reduced long before this date and finally complete]J" curtailed
b7 August ., 1949. 3 Aid to the nationalists on Formosa was resumed by the
United States in 1951 and has continued in various forms until the
present time. This assistance has been primari11" of a military nature
to build up the nationalist armed forces and offset the might of Comnmnist

China. 4 In addition, .American naval forces of the Seventh Fleet have

patrolled the Formosa Straits since 1951 to prevent a clash between the
two Chinas. The Korean War had a very- significant impact upon United
States policy toward Communist China.

The United States had bare]J" come

to recognize mainland China as communist when it was forced to regard the
recent ally as an enentV in actual combat.

This sobering experience con

tributed immenseq to the hard-line attitude which the United States has
generall,1" maintained toward Communist China throughout the great part of
the Cold War up until the present time. 5 American public opinion toward
3w1111am L. Langer (ed . ) ., An Encyclopedia of World History
(Boston : Houghton Mifflin Comp� 1952 ), p. 1210.
4John K. Fairbank ., Edwin o. Reischauer ., Albert M . Craig ., East
Asia: The Modem Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Comp&ny'.,
N5), �880.
Siiobert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York:

Doubledq
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China, which was formed during the Korean conflict and which views that
country with particular distate, has shown little inclination for

change . 6 This attitude has been re.fleeted in the actions of the Ameri
can government to a considerable degree� and any lessening of this
stand which may have occurred in the past two years has been primarily
as a result of efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict in Vietnam.
It was upon American insistence in June, 19$0 that the mainland
communist government was first denied the Chinese seat in the United
Nations in favor of the nationalist government which had held the seat
as the legal government of China since the start of the world organiza
tion . Only' days later, on June 27, 1950, the Security Council gave
approval for United Nations forces (then non-existent ) to oppose the
invasion of North Korean troops into South Korea. 7 The active support
initial]T supplied North Korea b;y Red China and, finally., the formal
intervention of Chinese armies on the side of North Korea against United
Nations forces did little to enhance the reputation of the mainland
Chinese government among ma.ey member states of the United Nations . The
United States, whose forces made up the overwhelming majority of the
United Nations forces--and casualties--had particular reas on to hold
harsh opinions of the C ommunist Chinese government.
American policy toward Conmnmist China has had two particularly
outstanding tactics which have been utilized since the years 1949 and
and Comp8l1J', 1964) , pp.

355-356.

6Ibid.
7Rqmond Dennett (ed . ), Documents � American Foreign Relations :

1950, respective11".

The first tactic has been the American ref'usal to

extend diplomatic recognition to the regime of' Mao Tse-tung.
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Instead,

the government of' Nationalist China on Formosa has been considered by

the United States to

be

the o� legitimate government of' China. The

communist regime is considered to be the � facto government of' the
mainland but not the � jure government which is the necessary qualif'ica-

tion for American recognition.

The forceful methods used by the com-

munists to attain power in China are the prima.ry cause for the United

States failure to grant reeogni tion to Mao Tse-tung I s government. The
reasoning behind this American policy reflects once again the overall
attention given to idealistic and moralistic considerations by the
United States in determining its foreign policy.

Yet, in regard to the

Communist Chinese regime in particular, the utilization of' morality- in

international relations
siderations.

has

proven beneficial for quite political con

Th.is refusal by the United States to extend diplomatic

recognition to Communist China has influenced many American allies,

particularly in South America and Southeast Asia, to follow the same

course of action . As a partial result of this refusal to grant recog
nition to the communist regime, coupled with the various alliances

which either fo� or implicitly prohibit close relations with the

Chinese Co:nummist government, the United States has been successful to
1951 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), llII, p. 955 .

8Pau1 E. Zinner (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations
195 7 (New York : Harper and Brothers, 19;8), pp . 340-341.
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a significant degree in containing Red Chinese influence in world
affairs.
The second tactic utilized by the United States to counter the
communist govemmen� in Peking has been to oppose that regime' s admis
sion to the General Assembl.7 and Security Council of the United Nations
as the legitimate government of China. As indicated earlier, this
policy was first used in 1950 and has been successfully carried out
each year since that time. While the General Assembly has always voted
to refuse to grant the Communist Chinese a seat in the world organiza
tion, the margin of support for the American position has declined from
a vote of thirty-three against and sixteen for seating with ten absten
tions in 1950, 9 to forty-seven against and forty-seven for admission

with twenty abstentions in 1965. lO Apparently because of the Vietnamese
War, the turmoil in Indonesia, and the beginning of the purges in Com
nnmist China, this trend against the American position was altered in
the November, 1966 vote which resulted in fifty-seven nations voting
against Red China ' s admission, forty-six for admission, and seventeen
abstentions. 11
9John w. Holmes, "Canada and China : The Dilemmas of a Middle
Power, " Policies Toward China, ed. A. M. Halpern (New York t McGraw
Hill Book Co. , 1965), P • 507 .
10The Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 17, 1966, p. 6.

11
•CoDDIUlliat China Vote t " Con essional Quarterly Weekly
Report, mv (December 2, 1966 J, 292f.
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Essentially the American position holds that the Nationalist
Chinese government is the on� legal government or China and, therefore,
the only government eligible for the China seat in the United Nations.
The United States also maintains that even if the communist regime were
regarded as a separate national entity, it would be ineligible for
United Nations membership on the basis or Article

4

of the United Nations

Charter which requires all member states to be "peace-loving"--reflecting
the fact that Communist China once waged war against United Nations
forces. The attitude of the United States was best summarized in a
speech to the members

or the Associated Press on Mq 10, 1954, by Henry

Cabot Lodge, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, who

indicated ten reasons why this country opposed Red China's admission to
the United Nations.

He indicated that American opposition was not oncy

because of the illegal accession to power of the communist govemment;
its continual fomenting of revolutions elsewhere; its commission of
atrocities against United States soldiers; and illegal imprisoning of
American citizens ; but also :

Because it has repeatedly expressed open contempt for the
purposes and principles of the United Nations, and the judgements
of the international conmmnity; because it stands convicted by
the United Nations as an aggressor in Korea where it killed and
wounded many tho�ands of American and other soldiers who were
defending peace.
This United States policy or excluding Red China from the United

12
United States Department of State, American Foreign Policy
l�0-1955; Basic Documents (Washington : Govel'lllllll!lt Printing Office,
1 9 7), PP • 342•343.
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Nations has achieved the desired results of once again helping to
isolate or at least reduce Chinese Communist influence in the world at
large.

In addition, this policy has prevented the establishment of an

other influential communist voice within the United Nations itself, par
ticular:q in the Security Council.
Another method which the United States has been able to utilize
effectivei,, in seeking to deter Chinese Communist expansion has actual�
served two purposes.

In

conjunction with other treaties, including the

ANZUS pact, the Philippines Treaty, the South Korea Treaty, and the
SEATO Treaty; the United States signed with Chiang Kai-shek the Re
public of China Treaty.

The China pact and the other treaties rounded

out the United States security system in the Western Pacific and have
served as an effective buffer to Communist Chinese expansion. 13 In
addition to countering the commmist expansion, the treaty with
Nationalist China has given the government of Chiang Kai-shek additional
prestige in international circles and has added validity to his conten
tion that his regime is the legal government of all China. As Secretary
or State Dulles indicated in discussing the treaty, the United States has
committed itself to the defense of the nationalist government on Formosa

against aggression from the comnnmist mainland, and, in addition,

guarantees that the nationalist government cannot be "bartered away" in
some future deal with Red China.
1.3nennett !?E.. cit., p.
.,
14Ibid.

955 •

Thus, American policy is not oni,,
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strongq opposed to Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations
and diplomatic recognition of the mainland regime, but

has

also become

treaty-bound to defend the nationalist govemment on Formosa.
At this jwicture it is advisable to examine the policies of
Canada on the China question in regard to diplomatic relations,
Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations, and Western defense
alliances. As mentioned earlier, Canada did not suffer the psychological
shock as did the United States when China went communist. It was dis
appointed by the chain of events which culminated in the ouster of the
nationalist government, but the fact that Canada was, to a large degree,
uninvolved in

the

Far East militated against any serious concern as that

shown by the United States.
Canadian policy in regard to recognition of Communist China has
been influenced from almost the beginning by American policy on the same
problem. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, however, Canada was
prepared to follow the lead of the Commonwealth nations such as Great
Britain and India and recognize the conmmnist regime, primarily' because
of its de � control of the mainland.is This initial but quite brief
attitude toward recognition soon changed with Chinese Communist partici
pation in the Korean War against the United Nations whose forces included
units from Canada.

"Canada took the attitude that it would be improper

and pointless to accord recognition to a regime which, although not
lSB. s. Keirstead, Canada in World Affairs :
Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 234-235 .

1951-1953 (Toronto :
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openly at war with the United Nations ., was ., nevertheless, sending

pretended • volunteer' forces to assist the enenv.• 16 After the con

clusion of the Korean War, Canadian policy continued to be one of non

recognition • . This policy was to a very considerable degree influenced

by the American policy or non-recognition.

The Canadian government

.felt that United States policy was so unyielding and American public
opinion so intense that Canada could not escape grave repercussions if

1
it granted diplomatic recognition to the connmmist regime. 7 Thus

Canadian policy became inextricab:cy, entwined with that of the United
States on the China question.

Canada

Since the establishment or this policy during the Korean War,
has

maintained the non-recognition policy throughout the last

fifteen years or the Cold War. Critics have continua� charged that
Canadian attitudes on the China problem have been dominated by the

United States ., and "just as the policy of non-recognition had acquired
a kind of symbolic significance in the United States, so in Canada it
had come to symbolize the domination of Canadian extemal policy by

·American interests. • 18 Yet ., even though

in

appearance, at least, Canada

might be following the lead of the United States on the China issue,

in

fact Canada had a somewhat more relaxed and conciliatory attitude toward

16Ibid . , p. 5 9 .

17�. , P • 235.

18James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs:
Oxford University Press ., 1959), P • 79.

1955-1957 (Toronto:

the Peking regime .
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Lester B. Pearson, who was then Minister of External

Affairs, stated in January-, 1956 the Canadian govemment • s official
policy toward Red China:
We have made this re-examination and we feel that the careful
policy we have been following ., and are still following has been
the right one; rejecting on the one hand immediate diplomatic
recognition but rejecting on the other hand the view that a
comrmmist regime in iJldng . can never be recognized as the
government of China.
From recent statements by Canadian leaders it is apparent that this
same general non-recognition policy is still the official policy in deal.

.

ing with Conmnmist China, but more attention is being given to opening
up contacts with the mainland. Trade between Canada and Communist China
has gone on for years, and newsmen, professional people, and other
interested individuals and groups have visited mainland China over a
20
lengthy period of time with the approval of the Canadian government.
Canadian officials have sought, through private contacts, to

temper .American policy toward China but have never blunt:cy- urged the
United States to reverse its position on the Communist China question.
Even though Canadian public opinion and the news media in recent years
have looked with favor upon recognizing the Mao Tse-tung government,

the Canadian government has maintained its long-held position of non
recognition.;.-particular� in light of the Vietnamese War. As one
19Ibid • P • 81.
.,

20
Holmes, �·
2

£!! • .,

1il>1d., p. 119.

P• lo6.

21
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authority put it :
To risk American irritation is one thingJ to make what
Americans would inevitabl.y' look upon as a friend]J' gesture
/recognition7 toward those who are abetting the killing of
American soldiers requires a degree of boldness and conf'igfnce
which has not characterized Canadian policy toward China .
It appears that for the near future at least ., Canadian policy toward
recognition of Conmnmist China will continue unchanged ., primari� because
of' American attitudes. While the United States has maintained diplomatic
contacts since 19$$ with the Red Chinese government through meetings in

Warsaw., Poland, and has ., in recent months., relaxed its restrictions upon
travel to mainland China by newsmen ., academicians, and other interested
parties., it seems most unlikely that the non-recognition policy will be
changed soon.

It does appear certain, however, that if' and when a

formula can be devised which is acceptable to the United States and
which guarantees the independence of both Chinas and provides for the
membership of both in the United Nations ., that Canada will accept it
2
immediately and welcomely. 3
In regard to the problem of Communist China's membership in the
United Nations, Canada ' s policy until late 1966 followed in a general wa;;y
that of' the United States but with a greater tendency to favor increased
contacts between the United Nations and Red China at some level. Just
as the United States, Canada has never voted for the seating of' Communist
China in the United Nations. Yet, Canada has been rather ambiguous on
22 Ibid. , p. 122 .
23 Ibid. , p. lll.

the question of admittance until recent times.
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In an address at Prince

ton University in 1955, Lester B. Pearson, then Minister of External

Affairs, remarked:

Certainly the absence from negotiations and discussions-
at the United Nations or elsevhere--of the de facto power on
the Chinese mainland makes impossible, without the consent of
the regime, the effective settlement of disputed matters
around that countey- 1 s periphery-: Korea, Formosa ., or Indo
China.

If' such problems as these are to be dealt with through the
United Nations by" conciliatory- procedures ., then either the
Comnunist Chinese must come to the United Nations, or the
United Nations DD.1st go t � them. There is no third course
except the use of force. 4
This 1955 statement reflected Canada's belief that it was desirable for

the United Nations to have some official dealings with the Chinese Com

munist government . While Canada followed a policy of opposing Red

China's admission into the world organization, the statement appears

purpose� vague regarding China's "coming to" the United Nations in

order that it not entire� exclude the chances of admission or openly

propose such admission.

Until late 1966 Canada's pollc7 had changed very little.

In a

statement on Comnunist China's admission to the United Nations, Paul

Martin ., the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, stated in March,
1966:

Although we have not been prepared to support the entry of
Communist China into the United N ations on the terms it has so

2
1i>onaJ.d c. Masters, Canada in World Affairs : 1953-1955
( Toronto : Oxford University Press .,1959), pp. 113-114.
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far set, we have ma.de it clear in our own statements of policy
that we recognized the dosirability of having that nation in
the world organization. 2'
Thus, Canada once again indicated that under the right conditions it
would be prepared to support Communist China's membership in the world
organization.

The right conditions for membership were, in part, the

same as those stated or implied on past occasions by the United States
and included respect for Formosa's independence and right to membership
in the United Nations, and the pledge not to engage in aggressive war
fare in the Far East. Differing from the American position, however,
Canada had not been insistent in holding to the belief that the com
munist regime was not the legal government of all of China. 26
In November, 1966 Canada significantly altered its position on
Comnnmist China's membership in the United Nations. Secretary of State
for External Affairs Paul Martin proposed that a two-China idea be
studied by the United Nations. Martin visualized a solution whereby
Communist China would be seated in both the Security Council and the
General Assemb:cy,, and Nationalist China would be dropped from the
Security Council but would remain seated in the General Assem.bly. 2 7 The
success of such a proposal is very Dlllch open to question, but the fact
25Paul Martin, "An Independent Foreign Policy, " External Affairs,
XVIII (March, 1966 ), 125.
2�ard Mc'Whinney, "Canadian-United States Commercial Relations
and International Law, " Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. David
R. Deener (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1963 ), p. 140.

2 7Tom Wicker, "Two Chinas, One China, No China, " New York Times,
November 16, 1966, P • 4.

that Canada

has

made a substantial change in its policy cannot

19

be

denied.

Canada is apparently initiating a new course of action in its China
policy which is different from that of the United States, and future
events may witness a permanent shif't in Canadian policy away from close
cooperation with the United States on the China problem.

It might be

mentioned at this point that even the position of. the United States has
become somewhat less rigid on the seating of Commnist China. While the
official American policy outlined by Ambassador Goldberg continued to
oppose admission, approval was given to an Italian proposal to establish
a committee for studying the entire China problem. In his statement
Goldberg seemed to imp� that if' Red China dropped its demands for the
ouster of Nationalist China from the worl� body and �nded its threats
and use of force against other independent states, the United States

might be willing to accept Communist Chinese membership in the United
Nations in some form. 28 Thus, the United States appears to be slowly
altering its position to some extent on this important question also,
but the recent upheavals in mainland China may alter this recent
apparent shift in attitude •
.Another comparison which can

be

made between United States and

Canadian policy relating to China concerns the relations of the two
countries with Nationalist China.

As discussed earlier, the United

States policy since 1951 has been to extend considerable aid of a
2 8un1ted States Department of State, "Move to Change Representa
tion of China in u. N. Again Rejected by the General Assembly, 11
Department of State Bullet.in, LV (December 19 1 1966 ) 1 927.
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primarily military nature to Chiang Kai-shek 1 s govemment and to stead
fast]J' support his claim that his government is the sole legal govern
ment of China. In addition, the United States has signed a treaty with
Chiang 1 ·s government protecting it from aggression from the mainland.
Canada has taken a different attitude toward Nationalist China.
While Canada has diplomatic relations with the Formosa govermnent, it
maintains no embassy or diplomatic personnel on the island. Nationalist
·china, however, does have representatives in Canada. 29 · Contrary to the
policy of the United States, Canada has no treaty obligations of any kind
with the Formosa government.

During the 1955 and 1958 confrontations in

the Formosa . Straits between nationali�t and communist forces over the

disputed islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Canada held to the opinion that
the disputes were a continuation of the Chinese Civil War and interven
tion by' outside forces was improper. The United States, after much
lack of elucidation, f� included the two island groups with.in the
Formosa treaty obligations, thereby committing American forces to the

defense of the islands. 3 0 Thus, during the two crises in the Formosa

Straits the United States was deep]J' committed while Canada remained
completely uninvolved .

A further difference between Canada ' s relations with the Formosa
government and those of the United States concerns the actual legal
29
Eayrs, � · cit., P • 82.
30

Ibid., PP • 82-83 .
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status of Chiang Kai..shek' s government. The United States places no
time limit on the nationalists ' claims of ownership to the island of
Formosa, but the Canadians regard Chiang ' s regime as only temporar,- and
believe that eventually the future of Formosa will have to be determined
1
on a permanent basis by the people of the island themselves. 3 From the
American standpoint it is essential that Formosa still be considered part
of pre-revolutionary China in order to support the very existence of a
Nationalist China at all.

If' Formosa were not regarded as a legal

province of China there would be only one China, and the American case
against Communist China would be seriously weakened. The Canadians,
however, have regarded the Chiang regime as an interloper and not fully
in tune with the feelings of the native Formosans. Sine� doubt had been
cast on China ' s claims to Formosa before the 1949 revolution, Canada
presently feels that the question of whether Formosa is an integral part
of China or an :independent entity is 'a proper question and should
32
resolved eventual.:cy".

be

This somewhat cooler attitude toward the legality of the Chiang
Kai-shek government on Canada ' s part is once again in line with i�s

general policy on the China question. While Canada has little sympathy

for the communist govemment of the mainland, i� has scarce]J' any more

for the nationalist government on Formosa. One Canadj8ll authority has
even argued that as far as Canada is concemed, •the key problem is not
l1n,id., P• 83.
32 Ibid.
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so much the recognition of Communist China as the issue of Formosa' s

future status. •33 If one accepts this theory regarding Canadian policy,
it would be possible to make the comparison that American policy on the

Chinese question revolves about the problem of the future status of the
communist mainland government while Canadian policy centers essentially
on �he issue of the future status or the nationalist government on For
mosa with the communist regime accepted as the legal government of all
of China.

The difference in the China policies of the two countries

would be significant according to this theory. Canadian public policy,
however, has not been this far divorced from that of the United States
so the merit of this theory is open to question since sufficient infor
mation is not in public hands .
The China policies of Canada and the United States are nowhere
ioore in opposition to each other than in regard to the question of trade
with the communist mainland.

Both countries "subscribe to the NATO rules

restricting the export of strategic materials to communist countries . •34

Since 1949 the United States has not only res tricted trade in strategic
goods, but, in addition, has prohibited all trade with the Minl.,nd re
gime.

The theory underqing the American policy is that a.ey trade with

the enemy is not in the national interest because of its beneficial
33ai.chard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs :
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 118.

19$9-1961

34John W. Holmes , "The Relationship in Alliance and in World
Affairs, " The United States and Canada, ed. John s. Dickey (Englewood
Cliffs, N .T.: Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1964) ., pp • . 117-ll8 .

effects for the opponent and, hence, should not be permitted. 3

S The
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American government is firmly committed to restricting trade with Red
China, and no changes in this policy will be forthcoming in the near
future.

In view of the Vietnam War presently being waged, it would be

impossible, militarily and politicaJ.1:T, to alter the present policy.
Canada has pursued a different policy entirely from that of the
United States. While the prohibition on trade in strategic material is
still in effect, trade in other commodities has been greatly expanded in
recent years. Prior to 1961 very- little trade took place between Com
munist China and Canada .

In 19$9, total trade between the two nations

amounted to $9 ., 2101 000, and in 1960 the total had risen to $13, 000 1 000
Beginning in 1961, however ., Canadian exports to China

worth of goods.

rose dramatically because of the large grain purchases which the latter
made with Canada beginning in that year. For the years 1961 throug�
1964, respectively, Canadian exports to Communist China totaled:

$125, 000., 000; $147, 000., 000J $10, ., 000, 000; and $136, 000, 000 worth of
36
commodities--almost entirely grain.
New and larger contracts have
been signed between the two countries in recent months.

Chinese exports

to Canada, however, have remained quite small in comparison ., and the
communist government has indicated that this imbalance cannot continue.
In 1963, Red China exported only $5 ., 0001 000 of furs, nuts, and textiles

3 5J . W. Fulbright, "Foreign Polley-Old Myths and New Realities, •

American Government: Readings and Casest ed. Peter Woll (second edition;
Boston: Little, Brown and Compaiiy., 196�J, pp. 531-532.
36ifollles

.,

"Canada and China., " 2.E• cit. , P • 113.
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to Canada, and in 1964 the figure was $8, 000, 000. 37
Two essential factors have motivated Canada in exporting wheat

and other grains to Red China. Economical]J', Canada has needed to trade
because it has suffered a balance of payments deficit, and in the ear;cy,
1960 1 s its farmers in the prairie provinces were suffering from depressed
markets.

In 1963 the prairie provinces remained Conservative in the

election, and this fact is attributed to the first grain deals

with

Communist China . 3 8 In the last few years public opinion in Canada has
come to favor these shipments of wheat, so politically it ·is profi�ble
to continue the transactions.

In ad.di tion, the Uni te.d States has been

in a much better economic position relative to Canad.a to be able to re
fuse to sell wheat to Communist China. 3 9 A second reason which has
swayed Canada is its belief that trade embargoes are not effective

instruments in altering opponents • foreign policies ; thus once again

°

differing from the American viewpoint. 4

For these two reasons Canada

has had a completely different trade policy toward Communist China than
has the United States, and for the foreseeable future it appears - that
both nations will continue their current trade policies relative to the
Chinese Communist government.
The overall China policies of the United States and Canada up
until very recent:cy have been fair:cy similar in the matters of
37 Ibid.
3 8Ibid., p. 107.
39Ibid. ,
P• ll3 .

40ibid.

recognition of the mainland regime and its admission to the United
Nations.
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Canada, more than the United States, has held to the hope that

some compromise solution uy be reached regarding the communist regime,
and with its new approach in the United Nations, a change may . be develop
ing in Canada's entire polic7 toward Red China. A different attitude
already exists f'rom. that of the United States regarding trade, relations

with the nationalist government ., and Far East al�ances.

Future events

may indicate that the two countries will utilize complete� different
policies in dealing with the China problem .

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The preceding ana�is of Canadian and United States foreign
policies indicates that several important conclusions can be made
regarding the foreign policies of both nations.
The most significant conclusion that can be stated is that both
countries are in agreement on the overall goals of their foreign policies.
During

the Cold War the United States and Canada have had as their pri

mary obj ective the preservation of their nations from conquest by inter
national conmiunism. For twenty years the foreign relations of both
countries have been conducted on the assumption that communism is a
constan� menace which manifests itself in virtually all aspects of
foreign affairs and DD1st always
particular policy.

be

considered in the fornmlation of any

Both the United States and Canada have recognized

not only the need but the desirability for collective action and mutual
defense alliances in protecting their own national interests. The two
nations share the idea that events far removed from their own shores
can ., nonetheless ., have a direct bearing upon their own countries and

that the maintenance of effective military- establishments and meaningful
f'oreign aid programs are essential in promoting their own interests.

As

the two giants of North America sharing similar languages ., cultures,
legal traditions, democratic ideals ., and interlocking economies ., their
futures are dependent upon one another, and their overall interests are
very similar.
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While the prima:cy objectives are much the same, the United States
and Canada have not always utilized the same methods for achieving these
goals or shared the same attitudes on particular issues. United States
policies have been based on the position it
occupies as leader of the
.
,,.

Free World, and American attitudes have been characterized by distrust
of and opposition to virtual.q all things communist .

Canada, as a middle

power, has been more flexible in its approach to international issues
touched by the influence of communism.

Canadian policies toward Castro

Cuba and Communist China serve as examples of this more flexible atti•
tude .

As

a middle power Canada

has

been able to propose altematives

to accepted policies which the United States could not do because of
its leadership role which requires it to move more slowly on adopting
new ideas and practices.

Canadian freedom of action is somewhat in

hibited by .American considerations, however, and a completel1" independent
foreign policy for the former is impossible under present circumstances.
As

leader of the Free World, United States interests and involvement

extend themselves into all areas of the world. Canada, as a lesser
power, � or may not find itself' d.irectq involved as a participant in
every event which occurs throughout the world, and this .f'act has enabled ·

Canada to remain somewhat more aloof than the United States on

many

issues and has enhanced its role as a mediator in world trouble spots.
The United States has resorted to such instruments as trade em
bargoes, refusal to grant diplomatic recognition, and denial of · member
ship in the United Nations to carry out its policies abroad.

Canada

has oftentimes opposed these methods because of what it feels is their
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ineffectiveness.

In addition, Canada has sometimes been unable to en

gage in restrictive trade practices or embargoes because of its weaker

economic position relative to the United States.

Canada has been influenced in its international relations by a

factor which the United States has not been faced with.

This factor

concerns Canada' s fear of absorption by the United States.

Because of

the numerous close ties between the two North American nations, Canada

has found it necessary to guard, jealousq., its own national interests •

.lt times, such as the Cuban missile crisis, this fact can inject itself
into Canadian foreign relations with unf'ortunate results.

An important fact gained from this ana�sis is that neither the

United States nor Canada formulates its foreign policies in a vacuum.
The two nations are so closely tied that neither can ignore the attitudes

of the other.

Problems concerning the Chinese and Cuban issues illustrate

that neither nation can act unilaterally without considering the wishes

of its neighbor. While the relationship is by no means equal and usually

sees the United States influencing Canada in its policies, the situation

does not always favor the larger.

The most effective ,Americ� check on

Canada is in the economic sphere because of its huge investment in

Canadian industry.

The primary check Canada has upon the United States

is of a political nature through its ability to question international

policies or actions of the latter.

From this study it is apparent that while Canadian and American

foreign policies share the same objectives and are often similar, there
are many differences which exist, particularly in regard to methods,
which distinguish the foreign policies of each country- from those of the other.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Air University Staff . Organization for National Security. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama: llr University, 1962.
Alexander, Fred. Canadians and Foreign Policy.
University Press , 1960.

Toronto :

Toronto

Ausland, John c., and Col. Hugh F . Richards on . "Crisis Management:
Berlin, Cyprus , Laos, " Foreign Affairs , XLIV (January, 1966), 291.303 .
Barkwq, Michael.

"Canada Rediscovers Its History, 1t Foreign Affairs ,

XXXVI (April, 1958 ) , 409-417 .

Bolles , Blair . The Big Change in Europe .
Company, 19,S:Clark, Gerald. Canada :
Company, 1965.

New York:

The Uneasy Neighbor .

W.

w.

New York:

Claude, Inis L. , Jr . Swords -Into Plowshares .
Random House, 1964.

Norton and

David McKq

Third edition .

New York:

"Comnnmist China Vote t " Con ssional Quarterly Weekly Report,
p
(December 2 1 1966 ) , 292 .

.mv

Conant, Melvin . " Canada ' s Role in. Western Defense , " Foreign Affairs ,
XL (April, 1962 ), 431-442 .
Cottrell, Alvin J . , and James E. Dougherty. The Politics of the Atlantic
Alliance . New York : Frederick A. Praegez=;- Inc . , 1964. -

96J

Crabb, Cecil V . , Jr . American Foreign Poli
edition . New Yorkt Harper and Row, l

in the Nuclear

!I!• Second

Curl, Peter v. (ed. ) . Documents .2!! American Foreign Relations :
New Yorkt Harper and Brothers , 1954.
Curtis , Michael.
Row, 1965 .

Westem European Integration .

Dawson, Robert M. The Government of Canada .
Toronto Press, 1901.

Nev York:

Toronto :

Harper and

University of

Deener, David R. (ed. ) . Canada-United States Treaty Relations .
N . c . : Duke University Pres s , 1963 .
90

�.

Durham,

91
Dennett, Rqmond ( ed. ) . Documents on American Foreign Relations :
Princeton : Princeton UniversityPress, 1953 .
Devine, Robert A. (ed. ) .
Book� , Inc . , 1960.

American Foreign Policy.

New York :

Dickey, John s . (ed. ) . The United States and Canada.
N . J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1964.
Eqrs , James . Canada in World Affairs :
University ,Press , US 9.
"Europe ' s New Mood--Its Meaning for
LI (June 201 1966 ) , 39-41.

1955-1957 .

u. s., " u. s .

1951 .

Meridian

Englewood Cliffs ,
Toronto :

Oxford

News and World
Report,
- -:--

Fairbank, John K . , Edwin o. Reischauer , and Albert M. Craig. East Asia :
The Modern Transformation . Boston: Houghton Mifflin Comp8Jl1',

1%5.

Fulbright, J. W. "Foreign Poli07--0ld Myths and New Realities, n
American Government: Readings and Cases . Edited by Peter Woll.
Boston : Little, Brown and Compaiiy, 1965. Pp . 526-544 .
Gerberding, William P . United States Forei� Policz: Perspectives ,!:!!!!
Analysis . New York: McGraw-Hill Book ompany., 1966 .
Griswold, A . Whitney. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States .
New Haven : Yale university Press , 1938. - --.
Halperin, Morton H.
Praeger, 1965 .
Harris , C . J . ( ed. ) .

China and the Bomb.

New York
· :

Quick Canadian Facts .

Harrison, W. E. c . · Canada in World Affairs :
Oxford University Press-;-1957 .

Toronto :

Frederick A.
Thom Press ., 1965 .

1949-19$0.

Hinton, Harold c. Communist China in World Politics .
Mifflin Company., 1966.

Toronto :

Boston :

Houghton

Holmes , John W. "Canada and China: The Dilemmas of a Middle Power, "
Policies Toward China. Edited by A . H . Halpern . New York : McGraw
Hill· Book Company-, 1965.
"Canada and the United States in World Politics, " Foreign
Affairs, XL (October, 1961) ., 10.$-117 •
• "Canada in Search of Its Role ., " Foreign Affairs , XLI (July,
-196
-3 ) ., 659-672 .

92
Horowitz, Robert s . !!!! 4;tarts We Watch .
Monarch Books , Inc . , 1
•

Derb.r, Connecticut :

Keirstead, B. s. Canada in World Affairs :
University Press, 1956.

1951-1953 .

Toronto :

Kennan, George F . Russia and the West Under Ienin and Stalin .
Little, Brown and Company', 196°L

Oxford
Boston:

Kenwortey-, E . W. ttThe Cuban Crisis of 1962 : A Case Study, " American
Govemment : Readings and Cases . Edited by Peter Woll . Boston :
Little, Brown and Compaiiy, 1965 . Pp . 357-385 .
Kissinger, Henry A. The Troubled Partnership .
Book Company, 1965.

New York:

McGraw-Hill

Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 17, 1966 .
Langer, William L. ( ed. ) . � En clopedia of World Historz.
Houghton Mifflin Comp&ey', 19l2.
MacArthur, Douglas .

1964.

Reminiscences . New York:

Boston:

McGraw-Hill Book Comp81J1',

Martin, Paul. "Canada and the Atlantic Community, " External Affairs ,
XVII (April, 196S), 12 3 -128 •
• Canada and the International Situation . Information Division,
--D-epartment of External Affairs , Circular 6L/36 . Ottawa: Department
of External Affairs, 1964 •
Foreign Policy, " External Affairs , XVllI
) 121-12a .
--cMarc
- • h"An1966Independent
.,

.,

Masters , Donald c . Canada in World Affairs :
Oxford Univers ity Press;-19597""

1953-1955. Toronto :

Morganthau, Hans J . Politics Among Nations .
Alfred A. Knopf, 1963 .

Third edition .

New York:

Morison, Sanmel Eliot . The Oxford History of the American People .
York: Oxford University Press , 196r, - Murphy, Robert.

pany, 1964.

Diplomat Among Warriors .

New York :

New

Doubleday and Com

Newman, Peter c. Renegade !!!, Power : The Diefenbaker Years .
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc . , 1963 .

New York:

"NORAD :

93

Defense of a Continent, " Time, LXI (November 25, 1951 ) , 58-67.

Pearson, Lester B . "The Face of the World in 1965, " External Affairs,
XVII (March, 1965 ) , 84-8 9 •
• "Good Neighborhood, " Foreign Affairs , XLIII (January, 1965 ),
--2-s-1-261 .
Posvar, Wesley W. (ed. ) . American Defense Policy.
Hopkins Press, 1965.
Preston, Richard A. Canada in World Affairs :
Oxford University Press,1965 .
Reed, Edvard . Readings for Democrats .
Inc ., 1960.

Baltimore:

1959-1961.

Johns

Toronto:

New York t · ocean.a Publications,

Saywell, Jo1m T. Canadian Annual Review for 1961.
of Toronto Press, 1962 .

Toronto:

University

Sehaetzel, J . Robert . "The Necessary Partnership, " Foreign Affairs,
XLIV (April, 1966 ), 417-433.
Spencer, Robert A. Canada in World Affairs:
Oxford University Press;-1959.

1946-1949.

Toronto:

Stebbins, Richard P . (ed . ) . Documents on American Foreign Relations :
1961. New York: Harper Brothers Company, 1962 .

United States Department of State. American Foreign Policy 19 0-19 :
Basic Documents. Washington: Government Printing Office, 19 7 •

• "Move to Challenge Representation of China in u. N. Again Re--�
jected by' the General Assembly, " Department of State Bulletin, LV
(December 19, 1966), 926-929.

-

Wicker, Tom. "Two Chinas, One China, No China, " New York Times,
November 16, 1966, p. 4 .
Zinner, Paul E. (ed . ) . Documents on American Foreign Relations :
New York : Harper and Brothers;-195S .

1957.

